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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
James F. Henry*
Good Morning. I am Jim Henry, President Emeritus of the CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution. We are going to have a Dialogue
on the relationship of moral values to the methods that we employ
to resolve legal conflicts, whether by litigation, negotiation, or alternative dispute resolution-many prefer the term "appropriate
dispute resolution"-or "ADR."
Organization of this Dialogue is a joint effort of CPR and the
Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University
School of Law. More specifically, it is the result of the considerable abilities and competence of Professor Russell Pearce, Co-Director of the Stein Center; Professor Jackie Nolan Haley, also of
Fordham Law; and Peter Kaskell, Senior Fellow of the CPR Institute. This effort also draws on some outstanding publications of
Professors Joseph Allegretti and Baruch Bush.
I have long believed that some examination of our basic, largely
religious, values was important. As commercial suits, increasing
numbers of domestic disputes, and even policy conflicts become
rougher and tougher, the need to get our basic values in focus
seems all the more essential.
At the same time, an examination of basic values and conflict
seems requisite in building a complete understanding of ADR. Although the benefits of ADR originally were perceived in tangible
terms, such as cost-cutting, ADR has evolved toward a recognition
of less tangible qualities, such as the benefit of better relationships,
transformative potential, and behavioral tools such as the effectiveness of apology. At the same time, we are discovering in the practice of ADR moral and ethical problems that we did not even
know existed a few years ago.
The purpose of this Dialogue is to commence a conversation.
Our task is to translate the thought and language of the religious
moralists into words that are understood by lawyers who represent
clients in the civil system, who litigate and attempt to resolve con* James F. Henry is the founder and President Emeritus of the CPR Institute for
Dispute Resolution. Mr. Henry is a Fellow of the American Bar Association and a
past member of the Board of Visitors of the John F. Kennedy School of Government
at Harvard University. He also served as a member of the White House Task Force
on Private Initiatives. He is a graduate of Williams College and Georgetown University Law Center.
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flict in an imperfect system and society. To that end, we convened
a distinguished panel to mull approaches the world's religions take
to solving conflicts. The panelists' presentations then will be
anchored in today's practice by three attorneys who will provide
remarks in response.
An examination of our basic values and our application of them
can be sensitizing, but at the same time, somewhat sensitive. If the
discussion generates doubt, disagreement, guilt, or even irritation,
it means that we have stimulated some thought and commenced a
conversation. Doing so through this Dialogue, in my judgment, is
an extremely worthwhile venture.

A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Joseph Allegretti*
In 1985, during the early days of the alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") movement, law professors Andrew McThenia and
Thomas Shaffer wrote an important article in which they claimed
that ADR should be supported for reasons other than cost-cutting
and time-saving.1 Instead, they argued that ADR was rooted in the
religious cultures of Judaism and Christianity. They wrote, "It is
from Torah and Gospel ...that we are most likely to be able to
sketch out radical alternatives to the law's response to disputes. As
a matter of fact, our religious culture contains both a theoretical2
basis for these alternatives and a way to apply theory to disputes."
This essay will examine and elaborate upon this claim. Following
McThenia and Shaffer, I will consider two questions: First, why and
how does Christianity provide a theoretical justification for ADR?
Second, what can Christianity teach us about the application and
practice of ADR?
A CHRISTIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR ADR
A Christian approach to ADR begins with the words and example of Jesus, because Christians believe that they are called to
model their life on his.3 Through his words and deeds Jesus
teaches that the reign of God-a reign that already has begun-is
characterized by peace, love, and the forgiveness of enemies.
Consider just a few of Jesus' teachings. In his Sermon on the
Mount, Jesus proclaims, "Blessed are the peacemakers/for they will
be called children of God." 4 Peacemaking cannot be divorced
* Douglas T. Hickey Professor of Business, Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y.;
B.A., Colgate University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977; M.Div., Yale Divinity School, 1989. The author would like to thank Professor Ron Volkmer of the
Creighton University School of Law for his advice and encouragement.
1. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J.

1660 (1985).
2. Id. at 1665.
3. STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN
ETHICS 75-76 (1983) ("[C]hristian ethics is not first of all an ethics of principles, laws,
or values, but an ethic that demands we attend to the life of a particular individualJesus of Nazareth.").
4. Matthew 5:9. All biblical quotations are taken from the NEW REVISED STANDARD VERSION.
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from love. According to Jesus, the two greatest Commandments
are to love God and love your neighbor as yourself.5 Christians are
called to a selfless love that extends even to enemies:
You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye and a tooth
for a tooth." But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if
anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; and if
anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as
well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second
mile .... You have heard that it was said, "You shall love your

neighbor and hate your enemy." But I say to you,
Love your
6
enemies and pray for those who persecute you.
Christian theologians continue to debate how best to interpret
these words, and Christians continue to disagree about how best to
live by them. However, few would deny that Jesus is exhorting his
followers to live out a new way of life.7 As Professor Allen Verhey
explains, "The reign of God that Jesus is announcing and already
manifesting, shapes and requires certain character traits: submissiveness to his reign, humility, the longing for the vindication of the
right, mercy, sincerity, and the disposition for peace."8
At the very least, then, Christians are called to be peacemakers
and healers of human conflict. They should bear wrongs patiently.
Reconciliation should replace retaliation. This suggests that Christians should be predisposed to support methods of conflict resolution that emphasize non-violence, forgiveness, and connectedness
between persons.
Another passage from the Gospel of Matthew speaks of how
Christians are to resolve disputes within their community:
If another member of the church sins against you, go and point
out the fault when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained that one. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so that every
word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the
church; and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church,
9
let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.
5. Mark 12: 28-34; see also Luke 10:25-37 (explicating Jesus' proclamation of the
law of love through the Parable of the Good Samaritan-an illustration of the kind of
neighbor-love that Christians are called to practice).
6. Matthew 5:38-41, 43.
7. ALLEN VERHEY, THE GREAT REVERSAL: ETHICS AND THE NEW TESTAMENT
86-87 (1984).

8. Id. at 86.
9. Matthew 15:17-18.
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This process for settling disputes within the community of faith
involves several steps.1" The first step is communication. The second is what today we call mediation-involving another community member as go-between. Then, if mediation fails, the dispute is
presented to the larger community for guidance. Only if the member still refuses to listen-and now is regarded as an "offender"should the Church expel him from membership.
But even that is not the end of the story. Jesus puts these rules
on Church discipline in their proper perspective through his teachings on forgiveness. Peter the Apostle asks, "Lord, if another
member of the church sins against me, how often should I forgive?
As many as seven times?" 11 Jesus responds, "Not seven times,
but, I tell you, seventy-seven times."'1 2 Christians should interpret
rules for conflict-resolution in light of the overriding obligation to
13
love and forgive one another without limit.
Not only the words of Jesus but also his actions are normative
for Christians. In his life and death, Jesus lived out the sayings of
the Sermon on the Mount. He did not return evil for evil. He did
not resist or retaliate when he was seized and sentenced to die. As
the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States put it:
In all his suffering, as in all of his life and ministry, Jesus refused
to defend himself with force or with violence. He endured violence and cruelty so that God's love might be fully manifest and
the world might be reconciled to the One from whom it had
become estranged. Even at his death, Jesus cried out for forgiveness for those who were his executioners: "Father, forgive them
,"14

Law professor Robert Taylor makes the same point humorously:
"It does give one ample pause for reflection to imagine our Lord
surrounded by a bevy of attache case-carrying attorneys zealously
striving to procure from Rome and the Sanhedrin every legal remedy, if any, to which the Crucified One would have been
15
entitled.'
10. See McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 1, at 1666 (finding a system of dispute
resolution in the Gospel of Saint Matthew, involving conversation, mediation, "airing
the dispute before representatives of the community," and finally, judgments).
11. Matthew 18:21.

12. Id. at 18:22.
13. WOLFGANG

SCHRAGE, THE ETHICS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT

149 (David E.

Green trans., Fortress Press 1988).

14.

NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE:

16 (1983) (quoting Luke 23:34).
15. Robert D. Taylor, Toward a Biblical Theology of Litigation: A Law Professor
Looks at 1 Cor. 6:1-11, 2 Ex AUDITU 105, 108 (1986).
GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE
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One other passage from the Christian Scriptures should be mentioned. In the First Letter to the Corinthians, Saint Paul criticizes
Christians who resort to the secular legal system. 16 Christians
should not bring their disputes with each other to the pagan courts.
Surely someone in the Church is wise enough to resolve these conflicts. Paul concludes, "In fact, to have lawsuits at all with one another is already a defeat for you. Why not rather be wronged?
Why not rather be defrauded? But you yourselves wrong and defraud-and believers at that."17
As with most Scripture, this passage can be read in a variety of
ways. Some interpret it to bar all lawsuits by Christians, others to
bar all lawsuits between Christians.' 8 But even if the passage is not
read literally, it still can be taken seriously. 19 At its core, Paul's
Letter to the Corinthians lays down two basic principles.2" First,
Paul adopts a strong pro-mediationview by insisting that Christians
should resolve their disputes with each other internally, within the
Church, rather than in the secular courts.21 Second, Paul adopts an
anti-litigation stance by claiming that it would be better for Christians to suffer wrongdoing rather than vindicate their legal rights in
court.2 2

In a masterful exegesis of 1 Corinthians6, the great Reformation
theologian John Calvin argues that Christians should view litigation as a last resort.3 In general, Christians should avoid the
16. 1 Corinthians6:1-8.
17. Id. at 6:7-8.

18. KEN SANDE, THE PEACEMAKER:
SONAL CONFLICT 221-26 (1991).

A

BIBLICAL GUIDE

To

RESOLVING PER-

19. As I have explained elsewhere, I do not read Saint Paul as establishing an
absolute prohibition on Christians resorting to the secular legal system. 1 Corinthians
6 should be read against the backdrop of the problems that were plaguing the Christian community in Corinth when Paul wrote his Epistle. JOSEPH ALLEGRETIi, THE
LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL PRACTICE 84-85 (1996).
20. Taylor, supra note 15, at 105. 1 am indebted to Taylor for the labels "promediation" and "anti-litigation" to express the core of Paul's teaching in 1 Corinthians 6.
21. Taylor, supra note 15, at 105; see also LYNN R. BUZZARD & LAURENCE ECK,
TELL IT TO THE CHURCH: RECONCILING OUT OF COURT 39 (1982) (arguing that Matthew 18 and 1 Corinthians6 support a biblical model of dispute settlement, and discussing efforts to create conciliation centers in which Christians can bring their
disputes to obtain a non-legal remedy); INST. FOR CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION, CHRISTIAN CONCILIATION HANDBOOK

16 (1994) (setting out procedures for biblically-based

conciliation process).
22. Id.
23. See Joseph Allegretti, "In All This Love Will Be The Best Guide":John Calvin
on the Christian's Resort to the Secular Legal System, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 1 (1991)
(examining Calvin's reading of 1 Corinthians6).
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courts. Litigation fractures the community, impairs the bonds of
love that should unite all persons, belies the teaching of Jesus to
bear wrongs patiently, and breeds vices such as greed and revenge
in the litigants. Nevertheless, Calvin allows litigation in the exceptional case when it can be undertaken without violating the fundamental command to love God and neighbor. Calvin's emphasis on
the primacy of love and healing dovetails nicely with some strands
of the ADR movement.24
What does this brief analysis of Christian Scripture teach us?
What lessons can we draw from it? We should beware of making
grandiose claims on the basis of a superficial reading of scanty evidence. Nevertheless, we can safely make several conclusions.
Christians should follow the teaching and examples of Jesus by eschewing violence and promoting peace. They should value reconciliation and the healing of the human community more than the
vindication of their legal rights. Christians always should go the
extra mile when it comes to resolving conflicts.
Furthermore, Christians should be skeptical of litigation as a way
to resolve problems and should seek creative alternatives. Although sometimes warranted, litigation too often separates rather
than unites, engenders hate and greed rather than love, and emphasizes winning rather than reconciliation. As Taylor puts it, litigation at its worst "is a fight unto death in which irreparable harm
(economic, psychological, and spiritual) is done to parties; but mediation, by contrast, makes room for compromise and human
growth. ' 25 In short, Christians have good reasons for supporting
ADR, reasons rooted not in efficiency but in Gospel values.26
A

CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO

ADR

Now that I have sketched broadly a Christian rationale for
ADR, I want to explore what form a Christian approach to ADR
might take. Does Christianity have anything distinctive to contrib24. See infra text accompanying notes 37-39, 45-46.
25. Taylor, supra note 15, at 109; see also Wayne Brazil, The Attorney as Victim:
Toward More Candor About the Psychological Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J.
LEGAL PROF. 107 (1978-79) (arguing that litigation can have negative effects on the
moral and psychological lives of lawyers; the gameplaying, deception, and amorality
that characterize litigation can spread to other areas of life, infecting relationships
with family and friends).
26. But see Robert D. Benjamin, Negotiation and Evil: The Sources of Religious
and Moral Resistance to the Settlement of Conflicts, 25 MEDIATION Q. 245 (1998) (arguing that some Christian beliefs create resistance to ADR).
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ute to the ADR process? What would a Christian approach to
ADR look like?
Fortunately, I have a story that may help to answer these questions. This is a story about one of the most beloved saints in the
Christian Church, Saint Francis of Assisi.27 It is the story of when
Francis was called upon to mediate a violent
dispute between the
28
wolf.
hungry
very
one
and
town of Gubbio
A fierce wolf was terrorizing the town of Gubbio. The wolf,
driven mad by hunger, was devouring both animals and human beings. Francis, who was visiting Gubbio, took pity on the townspeople. Despite the warnings of the people, he went out to meet the
wolf, alone, unarmed, protected only by his faith in God. When he
encountered the wolf, Francis gave the creature a stern lecture:
"Brother Wolf, you have done great harm in this region, and you
have committed horrible crimes by destroying God's creatures
without any mercy. ' 29 For its crimes, the wolf deserved to die.
But Francis sought a different kind of solution. He realized that
the wolf was driven to kill out of hunger. "But, Brother Wolf, I
want to make peace between you and them, so that they will not be
harmed by you any more, and after they have forgiven you all your
30
past crimes, neither men nor dogs will pursue you any more.
When the wolf showed by its gestures that it accepted Francis's
intervention, Francis suggested a compromise. If the wolf agreed
not to kill any more animals or people, the townspeople of Gubbio
would feed it each day. The wolf indicated its acceptance of the
compromise by extending its paw. When Francis returned to town
with the wolf at his side, the people were amazed at how gentle the
wolf acted. Francis then preached to the people and told them that
the wolf's attacks were in response to their sins. The townspeople
quickly consented to the agreement made between Francis and the
wolf. From that day on, both parties lived up to their promises.
The townspeople fed the wolf, and the wolf became so peaceful
that dogs would not even bark at it. When the wolf died, the
townspeople mourned its passing.
27. Other scholars also have found lessons for the mediation process in the life of
Saint Francis. See F. Matthews-Giba, Religious Dimensions of Mediation, 27 FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 1695 (2000) (examining the religious roots of mediation, with emphasis

on Francis and the Franciscan Order).
28. ST. FRANCIS OF Assisi, WRITINGS AND EARLY BIOGRAPHIES: ENGLISH OMNIBUS OF THE SOURCES FOR THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS 1348-51 (Marion A. Habig, ed.
1991) (recounting the story of the wolf at Gubbio).
29. Id. at 1349.
30. Id.
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What can we-modern, sophisticated, tough-as-nails lawyers and
businesspeople-learn from this medieval miracle story? Jim McIntosh uses the story to illustrate the essential elements of Franciscan peacemaking. 31 The story also can serve as the foundation for
a Franciscan-or, more broadly, a Christian-approach to ADR in
general and mediation in particular. Several elements of the story
can provide practical guidance to Christians involved in mediation
whether as a party, lawyer, or mediator.
First, notice that Francis goes out to meet the wolf unarmed.32
He acts non-violently. In the Middle Ages this meant going forth
without sword or shield. But violence comes in many forms-in
the context of mediation, violence can include explicitly or implicitly pressuring parties to reach a certain outcome, avoiding options
that the mediator does not favor, failing to listen to the parties,
bracketing certain painful issues, assuming the worst (e.g., he is
only in it for the money) rather than the best (e.g., he is trying to
do what he thinks is right) about a party.33 A Christian approach
to mediation would attempt to avoid these forms of violence. It
would honor the parties and recognize that their life decisions must
rest in their hands. This is in keeping, of course, with the Christian
understanding that all human beings are of unconditional value because they are created in the image and likeness of God.3 4
Second, Francis is interested in the growth of the parties as much
as in the specifics of a settlement.3 5 He is less concerned with splitting the difference than with forging a new relationship in which
the parties can flourish. He wants a solution that will be good for
both parties, not just temporarily, but permanently. "From that
day, the wolf and the people kept the pact which Saint Francis
made. The wolf lived two years more, and it went from door to
door for food. It hurt no one, and no one hurt it."' 36 Like Francis,
31. Jim McIntosh, OFM, Learning at Gubbio, at http.//www.wtu.edu/franciscan/
pages/misc/justice/lgubbio.html (last modified Oct. 19, 2000). According to McIntosh,
the essential elements of Franciscan peacemaking are: "(1) it requires active work; (2)
it is nonviolent; (3) it is Christ-centered; (4) it requires meeting all as brother and
sister; (5) it brings about reconciliation; (6) the resolution must be a just one." Id. I
have adapted McIntosh's model when developing my own list of the elements of
Christian mediation. Although our models are not identical, I owe much to his
approach.
32. ST. FRANCIS OF Assisi, supra note 28, at 1348.
33. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING To CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 6368 (1994) (discussing the ways mediators exert influence over settlements).
34. Genesis 1:26-27.
35. McIntosh, supra note 31.
36. ST. FRANCIS OF Assisi, supra note 28, at 1351.
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the Christian in mediation should look beyond positions and interests to get at the real issues troubling the parties and blocking them
from living fully and freely. The hope is that the parties will move
beyond their hates and fears, find the courage to forgive themselves and each other, and become more caring and compassionate.
Some mediators already adopt this approach. Robert Baruch
Bush and Joseph Folger, for example, argue that the goal of mediation should not be merely to improve the parties' situation but to
improve the parties themselves. 37 A successful mediation is one
"when the parties as persons are changed for the better, to some
degree, by what has occurred in the mediation process."38 Likewise, mediator Zena Zemeta argues that mediation can be a spiritual experience if the focus is put on restoring human
connectedness and healing the rupture that divides the parties.39
Third, Francis encouraged each party to see the situation from
the other's point of view. n° Why was there a conflict between the
wolf and the townspeople? Because the wolf was devouring the
people. Why was the wolf killing the people? Because it was hungry. But why was the wolf hungry? McIntosh explains that "[t]he
townspeople had enough to ea[t], while the wolf outside their walls
was starving. Although the townspeople probably thought of
themselves as victims of unprovoked violence and while there certainly can be no excuse for the wolf's behavior, it was the townspeople's unwillingness to share their food that was in part the cause
41
for the conflict."
Francis understood that the townspeople were partially responsible for the problem, and preached to them that the wolf's attacks
were caused by their sins. 42 A Christian approach to mediation
would encourage each party to move beyond narrow self-interest,
understand what is motivating the other side, and acknowledge the
legitimacy of the other party's concerns. For a true and lasting reconciliation, each party must enter imaginatively into the world of
the other. As attorney Atticus Finch says, in To Kill a Mockingbird, "You never really understand a person until you consider
things from his point of view ...until you climb into his skin and
43
walk around in it."
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 33, at 84.

Id.
Zena D. Zumeta, Spirituality and Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 25 (1993).
McIntosh, supra note 31.
Id.
ST. FRANCIS OF Assisi, supra note 28, at 1350.
HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 30 (Warner Books 1982) (1960).
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In this way, the mediator also shows a concern for justice. True
peace presupposes justice.44 An unjust agreement only engenders
further conflict. By encouraging the parties to see the best in each
other, rather than the worst, the mediator helps them to arrive at
an agreement that embraces the concerns of both parties and is
therefore fair to each.
One thing should be obvious from our study of Saint Francis. I
am not suggesting that Christians should blindly support all forms
of ADR. Arbitration, for example, often offers little room for reconciliation and forgiveness. Nor are all approaches to mediation
equal. When mediation is seen as merely a way to save time, cut
costs, or even to maximize the interests of the parties, it falls short
of the Gospel values lived and taught by Jesus and illustrated by
the story of Francis.
On the other hand, the so-called transformative approach to mediation is based upon a respect for the human self and a commitment to reconciliation that is in harmony with Christian values.45
Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger explain that in this model:
Transformation... involves changing not just situations but people themselves, and thus the society as a whole. It aims at creating "a better world," not just in the sense of a more smoothly or
fairly working version of what now exists but in the sense of a
different kind of world altogether. The goal is a world in which
people are not just better off but better: more human and more
humane. Achieving this goal means transforming people from
dependent beings concerned only with themselves (weak and
selfish people) into secure and self-reliant beings willing to be
concerned with and responsive to others (strong and caring people). The occurrence of this transformation brings out the intrinsic good, the highest level, within human beings. And with
changed, better human
beings, society as a whole becomes a
46
changed, better place.
To help people become more human and more humane is a goal
shared by Christians. This is an approach to ADR that Christians
can-and should-support with enthusiasm.
Of course, there is one way in which a distinctively Christian approach to mediation must differ even from the transformative
model of Bush and Folger. Return to the story of Francis and the
44. As Pope Paul VI wrote, "If you want Peace, work for Justice." OFFICIAL
(Rev. Vincent P. Mainelli ed., 1978).
45. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 33.

CATHOLIC TEACHINGS: SOCIAL JUSTICE 312

46. Id. at 29.
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wolf. Notice that everything Francis does is rooted in his understanding of himself as a follower of Jesus. As Francis goes out to
meet the wolf, we are told that he "placed his hope in the Lord
Jesus Christ who is master of all creatures."47 He is protected not
by sword or shield but by the Sign of the Cross. When Francis approaches the wolf, he speaks "[i]n the name of Christ. ' 48 The
"power of God ' 49 causes the ferocious wolf to back down. When
the townspeople accept the pact with the wolf, "they all shouted to
the sky, praising and blessing the Lord Jesus Christ who had sent
Saint Francis to them .. "50 And the story ends with the benediction, "Praised be Our Lord Jesus Christ. Amen."51
Ultimately, things are not in our hands, they are in God's. Peace
and justice are God's gifts. Our task is to be faithful to God, knowing that God's ways are not our ways, yet trusting that the God we
follow is a God of love, peace, and justice. We are not the stars of
the story, but we have an important role to play. Healing happens
through the "power of God,"52 but we can be the instruments of
that power. We can be the channels of that grace. In the words of
the beautiful prayer often ascribed to Saint Francis, "Lord, make
me an instrument of your peace; where there is hatred, let me sow
love; where there is injury, pardon."53 This, we might say, is the
prayer of the Christian in mediation.

47. ST. FRANCIS OF Assisi, supra note 28, at 1348.
48. Id. at 1349.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1351.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1349.
53. JOHN MICHAEL TALBOT WITH STEVE RABEY, THE LESSONS OF
How To BRING SIMPLICITY AND SPIRITUALITY INTO YOUR DAILY
(1997).

ST. FRANCIS:
LIFE 210-11

MEDIATION AND ADR: INSIGHTS FROM
THE JEWISH TRADITION
Robert A. Baruch Bush*

Two initial points will provide some context for these remarks.
First, my primary professional involvement has been not in legal
practice as such, but in alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") and
mediation, which has been my field of concentration over the last
twenty-five years, both before and after coming to Hofstra Law
School. Therefore, my comments will focus on how my view of this
field has been affected by my religious tradition.
Second, the perspective reflected in these comments grows out
of my own particular experience in relation to the Jewish tradition.
Specifically, my involvement in Jewish traditional life and thought
dates not from childhood, but from considerably later in life, and it
has proceeded through slow and somewhat painstaking study over
the last few decades. Therefore, my interest in ADR was first of all
the product of my experiences in secular study and work, beginning
in law school, and then in practice, teaching, and scholarship. Only
later, after that secular experience was already in place, did my
knowledge of the Jewish tradition begin to grow. As it did, my
perspective on mediation and ADR was confirmed, reinforced, and
refined by the insights of that tradition. Thus, the comments I offer
here are the product of a gradual growth in knowledge of Jewish
tradition that has been powerfully supportive of my original, intuitive attraction to and interest in ADR and mediation.
One of my first discoveries, made when I was already teaching
ADR but just beginning to study traditional Jewish sources, was a
section from the Mishna-which is the core of the Talmud, the primary source document of traditional rabbinic Judaism. At certain
times of the year, it is customary to study a section of the Mishna
called Pirke Avot-the Sayings of the Sages. In its talmudic context, Pirke Avot forms the conclusion of the laws of judicial procedure, and is essentially a code of ethics for rabbinical court judges.
However, it is traditionally understood as a set of important ethical
principles relevant to everyone.
* Professor Bush is the Harry H. Rains Distinguished Professor of Alternative
Dispute Resolution Law at the Hofstra University School of Law.
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Like all of the Mishna, Pirke Avot takes the form of teachings
attributed to sages of the Jewish tradition. On one particular occasion, while reading through the Sayings of the Sages, I stopped in
my tracks upon reading this passage:
Rabbi Yishmael [the son of Rabbi Yosay] said: [A judge] who
refrains from handing down legal judgments [but instead seeks
compromise between the litigants] removes from himself enmity, theft and [the responsibility for] an unnecessary oath. But
a judge who aggrandizes himself by [eagerly] issuing legal decisions is a fool, wicked and arrogant.'
The passage struck me like a flash of lightning. I thought that it
was truly remarkable-an explicit preference for compromise or
mediation, stated right in the Talmud itself! I was eager to find out
more about this talmudic view of what, in modern terms, we would
call mediation or ADR; although given my then level of literacy in
Jewish sources, this did not promise to be an easy task.
Fortunately, there were many English translations available.
Therefore, a little effort led me to a translation of a wonderful essay written by Moses Maimonides, 2 widely recognized as one of the
greatest scholars of Jewish law ever to have lived. Among his
many other works, Maimonides wrote an introduction to the Talmud, which comments specifically on the above statement from
3
Pirke Avot.
In explaining the principle that a judge should adopt a preference for resolving cases by compromise rather than adjudication,
Maimonides writes:
[The judge] must strive in all his cases to formulate a [compromise] settlement, and if he can refrain from passing a verdict his
entire life, constantly [facilitating] a fair settlement between the
litigants-how wonderfully pleasant that is!4
1. MISHNA, Pirkei Avot [Ethics of our Fathers] 4:9, reprinted in, SIDDUR TEHILLAT HASHEM 222 (Nissen Mangel trans., Kehot Publication Soc'y 1978) [emendation
in cited translation by original translator].

2. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204 C.E.), a physician and one of the most famous
Jewish philosophers and eminent rabbinical scholars, lived most of his life in Fostat,
near Cairo, Egypt. His principal works include: MISHNA TORAH [CODE OF LAW];
MOREH NEVUCHIM [GUIDE TO THE PERPLEXED] (philosophical work); PERUSH HAMISHNAYOT [COMMENTARY ON THE MISHNA]; see JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY (1991), http://www.us-israel.org/jsourcelbiography/Maimonides.html.
3. MAIMONIDES, MAIMONIDES' INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD, 122-23 (Zvi
Lampel trans., Judaica Press 1975) [bracketed text inserted by the author for clarity].

4. Id.
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In the final phrase, Maimonides alludes to a popular verse from
Psalms: "[B]ehold how good and how pleasant it is for brothers to
dwell together in unity."' 5 Quoting this verse is his way of emphasizing the great virtue of bringing about compromise. Drawing
upon his personal background as not only a judge and legal
scholar, but also an expert physician, Maimonides then explains the
principle in greater detail:
In short, the judge must be like an expert physician, who attempts a cure first through food, and not medicine, as long as he
can. Only if he sees the sickness intensifying, the food failing to
cure the patient, will he prescribe medicines, but gentle ones,
bearing resemblance to food ....Only if he still sees the patient

worsen, and that these means do not subdue and overcome his
sickness, will he then resort to curing him with strong drugs...
and bitter ...

medicines.6

As I read this, the analogy struck me as fascinating, especially considering the connections some of us see today between ADR and
related developments in law and other fields, such as "alternative
medicine" and "holistic lawyering." Maimonides made the connection several hundred years ago. His comment concludes:
Likewise, the judge must strive to effect a [compromise] settlement. If he cannot, then he should judge between the two litigants, but in a pleasant manner [still hoping to encourage them
to compromise]. Only if he is unable to do so because of the
stubbornness of one of the litigants who will stop at nothing in
order to prevail, then he must become more firm [and decide
the case according to the strict law].'
So, from this commentary, I learned some of the reasoning behind the ethical principle that a good judge is one who fosters compromise between the parties. However, as I continued to explore
5. Psalms 133:1.
6. MAIMONIDES, supra note 3,at 123.
7. Id. [Bracketed text inserted by the author for clarity]. There is no implication
here that every party who refuses to accept a compromise is wrong for doing so. For
example, if one party victimizes another in a clear injustice, and then offers a "compromise" that would simply continue the injustice, it is the victimizer who is "stopping
at nothing to prevail," and the victim would certainly be justified in demanding the
protection of the law. Nor will the court require such a party to compromise. Infra
note 12 and accompanying text. In general, Judaism's concern for social justice is by
no means abandoned in the preference for compromise. Rather, both are seen as
serving the larger ethical and moral principle of encouraging parties to "love your
fellow as yourself," in different ways. Infra text accompanying notes 23-28; see also
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1989).
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the subject, I discovered that the preference for compromise is
more than simply an ethical principle in Jewish tradition. It is actually a legal obligation on a judge in a traditional rabbinical court.
In fact, Maimonides himself includes it as one of the rules for
rabbinical court judges in his famous Code of Jewish law.8 Here is
the section of Maimonides' Code addressing the subject, freely
translated:
It is a positive legal obligation for the judge to say to the parties
at the beginning [of every civil case], "Do you really want to
litigate this case or wouldn't you prefer to work out a pshora
[compromise]?"'
As the syntax implies, and as the commentaries on this rule
make clear, the obligation of the judge is not just to ask the parties
whether they want to proceed by way of compromise or litigation.
A judge is also obliged to try to persuade the parties that compromise is preferable. 10 To quote one of the commentaries, "The
judge must explain to the parties that compromise will be more
satisfying for them.., and must speak heart to heart with them so
that they will agree to compromise ... because it is desirable for
one to make a compromise."11 The commentaries also clarify that
the process of compromise is indeed a form of ADR. Specifically,

8. MAIMONIDES, MISHNA TORAH [CODE OF LAW], Sefer Shoftim [Book of
Judges], Laws of Courts 22:4, at 121 (Mordechai Rabinowitz et al. eds., Mossad Harav
Kook 1976) [hereinafterRAMBAM L'AM] [translation by author].
9. Id. In this instance, as noted in the text, the translation is not strictly literal, but
conveys the accepted meaning of the rule as explained by the commentaries on it. See
also, YOSEF KARO, SHULCHAN ARUCH [CODE OF LAW], Choshen Mishpat [Civil
Law], Laws of Judges 12:2. The term pshora is sometimes translated as "arbitration,"
possibly because the codes themselves use another term, bitsua, as a synonym. The
commentaries make clear, however, that pshora is more properly understood as a
form of mediation, both in talmudic and in modern usage. Arbitration also plays a
role in rabbinical court procedure, but a very different one based on very different
reasons. Compare Menachem Elon, Compromise, in PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 570
(1975), with Menachem Elon, Arbitration, in PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra, at
565. See generally MAIMONIDES, MISHNA TORAH, BOOK OF JUDGES (Abraham M.
Hershman trans., Yale University Press 1949), for another English translated source
of Maimonides' Mishnah Torah.
10. See E. SCHOCHETMAN, SEDER HADIN [PROCEDURE OF JUDGMENT] 210 ("It

appears that the more common view of the authorities is that the court must try to...
persuade the parties to accept the suggestion to use compromise.") [translation by
author].
11. YEHOSHUA VAULK, MEIRAS AINAYIM [ENLIGHTENING THE EYES], on
Choshen Mishpat, [Civil Law], Laws of Judges 12:2 n.6 [translation by author].
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it is a voluntary, court-sponsored mediation process, with the judge
12
himself taking the role of mediator between the parties.
At this point, an obvious question would be: Why does Jewish
law hold that a mediated compromise between two parties is better
than a court-imposed judgment? Why would that be true, especially in a tradition where application of law, one would think, is
considered a lofty if not a supreme value? As if anticipating the
question, Maimonides explains this right in the Code itself, following the above statement of the judge's obligation.
He begins his explanation with words that echo his earlierquoted commentary on Pirke Avot, and then immediately gives the
scriptural basis for the legal rule:
The court that always succeeds in effectuating compromise between the litigants is praiseworthy, and regarding this it is said,
"the judgment of peace shall you judge in your gates."
(Zechariah 8:16)' 3
Clarifying the scriptural reference, Maimonides explains what is
meant by "the judgment of peace:" "What kind of judgment is accompanied by peace? The answer is: compromise."14
The commentaries explain the logic behind the answer: adjudication gives judgment, but it does not lead to peace because it produces a winner and loser, and the loser is unlikely to be appeased
or reconciled with the winner.15 By contrast, when a mediated
compromise is achieved, both parties are to some extent satisfied,
both parties accept the situation and each other better, and there12. A pshora, or compromise, is defined as a process in which "an agreement is
reached by concessions on all sides .... The difference between judgment and compromise is that in a judgment one side wins and the other loses, while in compromise,
the 'winner' does not take all and the 'loser' does not give all .... [In this process t]he
judges are the ones who mediate the concessions." RAMBAM L'AM, supra, note 9,
Laws of Courts 22:4, at 121-22 n.16-17. Though the court is obligated to try to persuade the parties to use the compromise (mediation) process, see supra notes 10-11
and accompanying text, the court cannot require parties to do so. See SCHOCHETMAN,
supra note 10, at 213 ("In Jewish law the general principle is that compromise requires
the voluntary agreement of the parties.").
13. RAMBAM L'AM, supra note 9, Laws of Courts 22:4, at 122.
14. Id.The Talmud, whose question and answer Maimonides paraphrases, puts it
even more strongly: "Surely where there is strict justice there is no peace, and where
there is peace there is no strict justice!" TALMUD BAVLI, Sanhedrin 6b (Soncino Press,
London).
15. RAMBAM L'AM, supra note 9, Laws of Courts 22:4, at 122 n.18 ("The loser
leaves angry and without accepting the result."); see also SCHOCHETMAN, supra note
10, at 208 (citing SHMUEL ELIEZER EDELS [MAHARSHA], COMMENTARY ON THE TALMUD, Sanhedrin 6b ("A compromise brings the agreement and acceptance of both
sides, by contrast to an adjudicated result, where the loser never gives up, in his mind,
his claim against the other side, even after the court has ruled in that side's favor.").
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fore enmity is reduced and connection is, to some extent at least,
restored.6 In this way, compromise constitutes "the judgment of
peace."'

Maimonides then adds another scriptural basis for the preference for compromise: "[A]nd thus it says regarding [King] David
[when he sat as a judge, as kings then did], 'David did judgment
and charity for all his people.' (2 Samuel 8:15)'17 Again, Maimonides clarifies the meaning of the verse, since judgment and charity
don't normally go hand in hand: "What kind of judgment is accompanied by charity? The answer is: compromise. ' 18 Here, too, the
commentaries explain the logic of the question and answer: adjudication does not involve charity, in any sense. The process does not
involve anyone's giving more than they must, or accepting less than
they deserve. Rather, parties get (and give) their just dessertstheir rights and obligations, no more and no less. 9
By contrast, in making a compromise, parties do more than they
really are required to do; they accept less than they are entitled to,
or give more than they are obligated to give. That is the very nature of a compromise. In compromise, in other words, parties go
beyond the letter of the law, beyond what is strictly required, beyond the call of duty-and that is the very essence of the virtue
called charity. 20 Therefore, when a compromise is mediated and
16. See Joseph B. Soloveitchik, The Role of the Judge, in SHIUREI HARAV: A CONSPECTUS OF THE PUBLIC LECTURES OF RABBI JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK 81, 82 (Joseph Epstein ed., 1974) ("As a result of one victor and one loser, hatred deepens,
animosity is intensified .... [Compromise] brings peace by getting the litigants to
retreat ... and see that neither was totally right nor wrong .... Peace and friendship
are restored.").
17. RAMBAM L'AM, supra note 9, Laws of Courts 22:4, at 122. The term "charity"
is the translation of the Hebrew word tzedaka, which is translated as both "charity"
and "righteousness." According to the commentaries, and to the Talmud itself, it appears that "charity" is the more appropriate translation here. See TALMUD BAVLI,
Sanhedrin 6b; infra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
18. RAMBAM L'AM, supra note 9,Laws of Courts 22:4 at 122.
19. See Soloveitchik, supra note 16, at 82 ("Matters of litigation are resolved by
victory for one and defeat for another. Victory and loss are total.").
20. See RAMBAM L'AM, supra note 9, Laws of Courts 22:4, at 121 n.20-21 ("The
implied meaning [of 'judgment and charity'] is disregarding one's legal claims and
going beyond the requirement of the law.... Pshora is like apportioning the claim, as
described above [i.e., so that each side either gets less than it deserves or gives more
than it owes]."); see also Soloveitchik, supra note 16, at 82 ("Judaism knows of a
charitable justice .... A human being can never be completely right because he is
finite .... But if he can't be unreservedly right, he can also never be completely
wrong. The two litigants .. .are both right and wrong. Therefore Judaism tries to
protect against total defeat .... [In pshora,] both participants give up something. This
is a judgment that is righteous [and charitable].").
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confirmed by the court, there is judgment and charity at the same
time.
So in my initial explorations of traditional Jewish sources, both
ethical and legal, I found that both place the highest value, not on
the application of law to resolve conflict, but on the achievement of
compromise through a form of "judicial mediation."' x This discovery was gratifying as a source of support for my longstanding interest in mediation and ADR;2 2 but it also was surprising and
puzzling. I had always assumed the Jewish tradition elevated the
concept of law to the highest level. Now I found that mediation
and compromise actually were preferred to adjudication on the basis of law. It took some further study to assimilate and understand
more fully the essential moral insight implicit in this principle from
the tradition.
In fact, the explanations offered by Maimonides and the rabbinic
commentaries, taken together, pointed the way to this deeper insight. The scriptural references and rabbinic explanations of "judgment of peace" and "judgment and charity" imply that, in Jewish
tradition, the process of compromise reflects and embodies two
fundamental values: the value of shalom, peace or reconciliation;
and the value of tzekada, charity, in the sense of going beyond
one's strict obligations to others. However, traditional teachings
suggest that both of these values embody a still higher principle:
whether in striving for peace or in acting charitably toward others,
the common element is that the person, while still aware of individual self and needs, lets go of the self for a moment, sets the self
aside as it were, and acknowledges and reaches out toward the
other fellow.
It is this self-conscious transcendence of self and reaching toward
other that is seen as the essence of both peace and charity, at least
21. See Soloveitchik, supra note 16, at 82 ("[C]ompromise is the ideal legal solution, not strict adherence to legality."). It is important to note that the significance of
this view is that the law itself, in Jewish tradition, incorporates recognition of the
value of disregardingone's legal rights or going beyond one's legal obligations.
22. This is not to suggest that I favor adoption, in our secular legal system, of the
practice of judicial mediation. For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this article,
I do not believe that would be a good policy. Nevertheless, my interest in the use of
mediation to address conflict, within and beyond the legal system, has long been
based on values that find support in the Jewish tradition's view of the ethical and
moral significance of compromise. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P.
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION

(1994). As noted at the outset of this essay, the in-

sights I have gained through study of the tradition have supported and refined my
understanding of the value of mediation, although my views originated from secular
practice and study.

1014

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII

in the Jewish tradition, and I suspect within all of our great ethical
traditions; it is also the essence of mediation and compromise.
This, then, is the value that the Jewish tradition sees in compromise. To express it formally, the value is self-conscious, self-aware,
self-transcendence. In more colloquial terms, the value lies in finding a way to stand up for oneself while simultaneously making
room for the other. Precisely because the Jewish tradition places
such great value on fostering this kind of relation between people
as fellow human beings, it places value on and encourages
processes of compromise and mediation.23
Having reached a deeper understanding of the basis of the preference for compromise, I began to see how this principle of conflict
intervention is connected to fundamental themes running throughout the great ethical teachings of Judaism. For example, the book
of Leviticus24 proclaims the famous injunction, "Love your fellow
as yourself."25 And the traditional commentary on this verse notes
that Rabbi Akiva,26 one of the great sages of the Talmud, said,
"This is the fundamental principle of the Torah. '27 The all-encompassing principle of moral conduct is to love your fellow as yourself. What is implied in this principle? The point is that you have
to do both. It is natural and understandable to care about yourself,
and, in fact, a person must have healthy self-respect. But it is not
enough to consider and respect yourself only. The fulfillment of
the moral imperative is to love your fellow as yourself, to recognize
and integrate consideration for both self and other equally. That is
the challenge-the moral challenge, the religious challenge-not
only in responding to conflict but in all realms of human
interaction.
To come full circle, back to the first of the traditional sources I
discovered, there is another very well-known passage in Pirke Avot
23. See supra note 21; see also Soloveitchik, supra note 16, at 82 ("In compromise,
the litigants see that neither was totally right nor wrong. This is not merely a judicial
decision-it is enlightenment.")
24. The Torah consists of the Five Books of Moses. The third book is Leviticus.
25. Leviticus 19:18.
26. Rabbi Akiva (50-135 C.E.) was one of Judaism's greatest scholars. He grew up

a poor, semi-literate shepherd, but at the age of forty he began a sincere study of the
law and had a decisive influence on its development of the Jewish oral law. Many
talmudic scholars trace their learning from Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Akiva, at http://
www.us.-israel.org/jsource/biography/akiba.html.
27. TANACH (TORAH/PROPHETS/WRITINGS): THE TWENTY-FoUR BOOKS OF THE
BIBLE 279 (Stone Edition, Mesorah Publications 1998). This is the commentary of
Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, or "Rashi," the most widely accepted commentator on the
biblical text.
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that reflects the same ethical principle-integration of concern for
self and other, self-conscious self-transcendence. It might serve almost as a motto, a slogan, for those supportive of processes like
mediation:
[Rabbi Hillel] used to say:
If I am not for myself, who is for me?
And if I am only for myself,
what am I?
28
And if not now, when?
As Hillel's teaching suggests, it is certainly proper to stand up for
oneself, in conflict and in general. It is not only proper, but necessary. But, as the teaching continues, there also has to be the movement outwards, the acknowledgment and reaching out toward the
other. Otherwise, as Hillel eloquently puts it, even if I have succeeded in standing up for myself, what am I? I have gone only half
way toward fulfilling the moral imperative of considering both self
and other, loving other as much as self, achieving a full-fledged
humanity. And as the Mishna concludes, if not now, when? What
are we waiting for? Of course it is hard to achieve this kind of selfconscious self-transcendence under any circumstances, and especially in the midst of conflict. But Hillel's saying encourages us to
meet the challenge head-on, without shying away from it or seeing
it as too difficult. Read as a whole, the teaching is that standing up
for self, while simultaneously making room for other, is not only
possible but necessary to being fully human. Therefore, a process
that encourages and supports people in doing so, like mediation, is
considered uniquely valuable in the Jewish tradition.
I have continued to discover a wealth of insights in traditional
Jewish sources that enrich my understanding of conflict and mediation. It has been a privilege to share some of them.

28.

MISHNA,

Pirke Avot 1:14, supra note 1, at 213.
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CREATING SACRED SPACE: TOWARD A
SECOND-GENERATION DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PRACTICE
Sara Cobb*

There have been times, during the course of a mediation, or a
facilitation, when I have had the impression that something happens in the room, something that is more important than the agreement that is emerging, that the conflict is itself just a vehicle for the
creation of something sacred, something whole, something holy.
This experience of mine often coincides with confessions on the
part of the disputants and a quality of sharing that exceeds the
technical boundaries of problem-solving processes; apologies are
offered, personal stories exchanged, even pictures of children,
grandchildren, and vacation homes appear. It is as though the process of conflict resolution cannot contain the often spontaneous
and reciprocal expressions of relief and renewed hope that emerge
not only as a result of the agreement, but also in the course of its
construction. Interaction patterns shift' and people express wonder and curiosity about the source of these changes in their sense
of the "Other," as well as their experience of themselves, and
about their sense of a new morality (or their return to a very old
morality) that permits the existence of the Other without compromising deeply held values. Alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") is, in these instances, more than the sum of its parts, and

* Sara Cobb, Ph.D., is the Executive Director of the Program on Negotiation,
Harvard Law School.
1. Although there may be a statistically significant relationship between the presence of an agreement and shifts in the way parties relate to each other as the session
ends, there is no research that documents a causal relationship. Furthermore, anecdotally, I have witnessed sessions in which agreements were reached without accompanying shifts in interaction patterns. Follow-up data on some of these cases show that
the agreements hold, despite the absence of shifts in interaction at the time of the
agreement. So agreements may be effective without the presence of any shifts in the
quality of the relationship between parties. This would support the notion that conflict
resolution is not coterminous with repair of ruptures in the social bond. For a discussion of the process of rupture and repair in social bonds, see Suzanne Retzinger &
Thomas Scheff, Emotion, Alienation, and Narratives:Resolving Intractable Conflict, 18
MEDIATION Q. 71 (2000).
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the resulting mystery remains inexplicable within the vocabulary of
ADR.2
Although the field of conflict resolution acknowledges that
agreements can alter the nature of interaction between disputants,
it constructs this shift as a function of the agreement, as a result or
an outcome of the process. Practitioners use this shift in interaction as evidence of: (1) the presence of respect or recognition on
the part of one party for the other; 3 (2) the viability of long-term
improvements of relationships between parties;4 and (3) even as
evidence that parties will be able to transfer the experience (skills)
of the conflict resolution process to other conflicts.5 Thus the benefits of altered interactions are instrumentally construed-relationships are improved, the agreement will be more durable, and
parties will be more able to apply the experience of one positive
conflict resolution process to another conflict, by themselves, in
their future. Although these benefits may well appear, as a result
of the structure and process within mediation, they do not describe
either the experience of the relational space or the emergence of
morality itself.
Beyond these instrumental accounts, there lurks the presence of
a relational process that defies our explanations as practitioners.
Even further, attempts to define or describe these processes in
non-instrumental terms, as communion (rather than the convening
of stakeholders), as a process of witnessing (rather than listening),
2. See generally Albie M. Davis, The Logic Behind the Magic of Mediation, 5
NEGOTIATION J. 17 (1989). Davis endeavors to account for the "magic" of the mediation process. I am not at all suggesting in this essay that "magic" happens. On the
contrary, I am hoping to show that what we take as "magic" is, in fact, a set of technical practices that yields shifts in interactional patterns.
3. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA.
TION 2-3 (1994) (discussing the role of recognition in the mediation process). However, Bush and Folger do not construct this as a dynamic or systemic process, but as
an intrapsychic process within an individual.
4. Judith E. Innes, EvaluatingConsensus Building, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING
HANDBOOK 631 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (discussing the methodological
problems related to outcome research in consensus building processes); Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: Reflections on a Decade of Research, in
MEDIATION RESEARCH 9 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989) (reviewing research on
divorce mediation). Even though these studies are ten years apart, the problems related to longitudinal research remain.
5. Jeffrey Loewenstein & Leigh Thompson, The Challenge of Learning, 16 NEGOTIATION J. 399, 406 (2000) (describing the role of analogy in learning). Loewenstein
and Thompson argue that the transfer of skills requires the development of comparisons through analogy. Id. This research would suggest that the mediation process
alone would not be instrumental in the development of the ability to transfer skill sets
from the session to other conflicts.
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as a process of giving testimony (rather than stating interests), and
as the creation of a covenant (rather than an agreement), constitute a serious transgression, blurring ADR's secular language with
a language from religion(s), defying the boundary between church/
synagogue/mosque/temple and state. The tenacity of ADR's secular discourse grows out of the strength of our collective fear of
blurring this boundary.
This secular discourse is itself what Foucault has called a "regime
of discourse," 6 completely consonant and resonant with the state;
"neutrality," rather than morality is celebrated; "turntaking,"
rather than reframing, is the vehicle for ensuring "equal participation"; and "consensus," rather than understanding, is the objective.
ADR has adopted, in a rather wholesale fashion, the discourse of
the (democratic) state, a discourse of decision-making, not by majority rule, but via consensus building. This discourse struggles to
erase its own moral commitments-equality, participation, voice,
and personal responsibility-precisely so that it can position itself
within value-based disputes, as an alternative, "neutral," frame.
This is possible because these moral values are so pervasive within
our democratic culture that we do not notice them as moral commitments; we do not notice them as a frame for containing moral
discussions that is itself a moral framework.7
Furthermore, this secular discourse transforms any discussion of
morality into a pragmatic discussion of needs and interests. The
coincidence of the pragmatist view of conflict as based on competing needs and interests maps completely onto the discourse of the
state; our secular state is founded on the notion that there will be a
diversity of views, and that there is no Archimedean moral frame
from which to judge, other than the values of the state itself, expressed in the U.S. Constitution (equality, voice, participation) as
these are seen as values that ensure the possibility of diverse values. However, even though these may well be "meta-values" in
that they function to permit other values to flourish, they are still
values and retain their privilege as frames for negotiating moral
6. Michel Foucault, Politics and the Study of Discourse, in THE FOUCAULT EFFEct 53 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).

7. Although there is some acknowledgement within alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") that disputes are moral contests between competing moral frames,
there is very little research on how morality is negotiated. See ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?

3-4, 8-10 (1988) (stating that

there is no longer a unified or stable frame from which to assess morality, once we
grant that there are multiple realities, each with its own form of rationality and
justice).
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discussions. As the values of the secular discourse mask themselves, morality itself is expunged from our ADR discourse-the
moral frames of ADR itself are enveloped by the discourse of the
state; and the moral frames of parties are disguised as "needs" and
"interests," rather than described explicitly as moral commitments.
So relative to both the content of the process, as well as accounts
about the process (in training manuals, theory, and research), the
process and experience of moral discussion is effaced in our ADR
practice.
Clearly there is a "regime of discourse" in ADR that systematically eludes discussion of the functional accounts of relational
space and moral discussion. Experience is flattened into "satisfaction" with outcomes, the moral frameworks that emerge as the infrastructure of this relational space are either effaced by a
discourse of "neutrality" or collapsed into a discourse of "participation." What we know about ADR is a function of the vocabulary that is harnessed to describe and prescribe its practices. Since
prescriptions for practice carry, like a DNA code, moral
frameworks for evaluating practice, the discourse that houses our
prescriptions for practice determines what moral frameworks we
use to evaluate practice, as well as to train others. An examination
of this regime of discourse reveals how the moral frameworks of
ADR, buried in our prescriptions for practice, paradoxically disable attention to the pragmatics of moral discussion. Given that
we cannot understand what we cannot name, I shall attempt to
provide a new vocabulary for describing the pragmatics of moral
discussion, as well as a prescription for ADR practice that reinstates moral discussion as central to conflict resolution processes.
MORAL DISCUSSION AS (SACRED) NARRATIVE PRACTICE

Morality is not a set of abstract decontextualized rules collected
into a set of prescriptions for behavior; it is a story about a set of
events, characters, and themes that exemplifies what to do and
what not to do, carried within embedded metaphors that make
sense of the world (e.g., "She acts like a princess

. .

.") and materi-

alized in a narrative form. In ADR processes, moral discussion involves the negotiation of the past that builds toward instructions
for the present and the future. Parties in conflict are captured by
the stories they tell about the problem, its antecedent, and the roles
played, and there is always a moral to their story, a theme that
usually reconfirms, as do all the other parts of the story, their
description of the problem. Inevitably, the "moral of the story" is
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that the Other has to change in some way, as well as offer restitution.8 As a narrative operates as a system, its entire component
parts function in an interrelated fashion to maintain the integrity of
the meaning of the whole narrative. Likewise, any change to a portion of the narrative, i.e., roles, plot line, or themes, shifts the
meaning of the whole narrative. Moral discussion, from this perspective, is often simply the reiteration by each party of their story,
as they elaborate plot lines, values, or character roles that reconfirm and anchor the "moral of the story." In order to generate
shifts in the moral of the story, there must be some evolution of the
story content of both parties. Seen from this perspective, productive moral discussion is not simply talking about values, it is the
process of evolving the content of narratives so that there is a shift
in the moral corollaries associated with a story.
Consider the following case: I was asked to mediate a dispute
within a partnership of a small accounting firm. The three partners
included two young women, Beth and Anne, brought up through
the ranks by the man, Steve, who initiated the firm. Steve was convinced that one of his partners (Beth) was behaving destructively
and fomenting coalitions against him within the firm. He asked for
a mediation to develop an agreement about how they would work
through their differences, as she had repeatedly had "tantrums" on
occasions when he tried to air his views.
Beth agreed to the mediation, eager to have a forum in which
she could air a host of complaints against Steve. She routinely felt
he ignored her input; Beth also felt that the other partner, Anne,
functioned too much like Steve's (favored) daughter, never standing up to him, which put all the responsibility for contestation (airing differences) on her. Anne indicated, in an initial interview, 9
8. In a set of approximately thirty mediation sessions, videotaped and audiotaped
for research, Janet Rifkin and I found that it was not at all uncommon for disputants
to recommend to the mediator-often during a caucus-that the Other should go see
a therapist. This was not a systematic research finding, but more an incidental one. We
never did any systematic research on this issue. There was a need expressed for the
Other to change, as well as to repay for some damage that was done. Furthermore, in
some cases, parties made this recommendation for the Other to go to therapy independent of whether or not there was an agreement reached.
9. Based on the discourse analytic research that Janet Rifkin and I conducted on
mediation sessions, we found that the first party to speak "colonizes" the discursive
terrain, making it difficult for the second party to do other than defend themselves.
Sara Cobb & Janet Rifkin, Practice and Paradox:DeconstructingNeutrality in Mediation, 16 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 35, 53 (1991) (discussing this colonizing process). Therefore, I often conduct separate initial interviews when I am concerned over the
volatility or the marginality of one or more of the parties. In this case, I was concerned about both, so I met with the parties separately.
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that she was concerned about Beth's "hot temper" and felt sorry
for Steve, even though she often agreed with Beth that Steve functioned, all too freguently, in an authoritarian fashion.
At the opening of the public session, I asked Steve to choose an
instance that he felt exemplified the problematic interaction with
Beth. Steve told of a time when Beth stormed into his office,
shouting about a set of bookcases that were in the process of being
built in the corridor, outside the staff kitchen area. He described
his shock and dismay over her behavior and his distress that the
staff knew they were in conflict, which he felt diminished his authority in the firm and feared could lead to triangulations between
staff and partners.
Like most stories that appear at the opening of ADR processes,
Steve's story is a victim story, carefully constructed so as to position Beth as morally inappropriate and, no doubt, he has practiced
this story with others, perhaps his wife, perhaps other family members and close friends. Victim stories are public-they do not become relevant unless and until they are witnessed by others.
Girard has described this process of witnessing victimization, noting that victims call for witnesses."0 He describes victim stories as
sacred processes through which community, morality, and law itself
are born as people gather together, formed through collective inquiry, to make sense of what happened to the victim." He argues
that victimization is essential to the birth of law and community
which can only materialize as people work collectively, in some
public realm, to assign causality and develop moral corollaries as a
12
way to redress "the body of the victim.1

10.

REN9 GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED

79-80, 258-67 (Patrick Gregory

trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1977) (1972). I am not suggesting that all victims
want their pain witnessed; on the contrary, many victims adopt the story of their victimizer and struggle to hide their pain. This is not to be confused with the social
construction of victims, as the objects of weapons and the locations of wounds. See
ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN

(1985) (discussing how pain is storied, and in the

process, victims and weapons, if not victimizers, emerge).
11. GIRARD, supra note 10, at 79-80, 258-67.

12. Id. The "body of the victim" is a phrase used by ANDREW J. MCKENNA in his
book, VIOLENCE AND DIFFERENCE (1992); it invokes the visual imagery of the victim's body because speakers locate wounds (emotional and physical) on a specific
person who is harmed. Thus "the body" is a site for making the victim present to
others. It also makes obvious that the body is often in some way presented as marked
by victimization, so the body of the victim becomes the record that victimization
occurred.
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Examining mediation (or ADR) as a process of "tracing the vic-

tim' 1 3 provides a window into the sacred process though which

community and morality emerge. However, because conflict stories are morality tales, the repetition of morality tales by either
party does not constitute the creation of community; community
requires the creation of some consensus about "the body of the
victim." Paradoxically, "the body of the victim" disappears as a
new story (about who did what to whom and why) emerges, as this
case study will demonstrate.' 4
Steve describes himself as helpless either to predict or affect
Beth's "emotional storms" which "toss him about," and he feels
"capsized." Steve links events together in a way that construes
Beth as irrational and in such a fashion that the consequences of
her action could well bring about the demise of the firm that he
worked so hard to build. The morality that emerges is one that
heralds Steve's sacrifice and hard work over the years, his rationality, and the overall goal of coherent leadership of the firm, toward
not only its profitability, but also the maintenance of the sense of
"family" that helps foster trust and good relations across staff and
between staff and partners. This opening permitted Steve to elaborate his position as victim, as well as the moral frames that function
as the platform for his legitimacy and Beth's delegitimacy (she had
not made similar sacrifices-in fact many "goodies" had come easy
for her-she was not rational, and she cared little for the long-term
viability of the firm, much less the "family" environment).
Like almost all disputants in mediation, Steve externalizes responsibility, locating the cause of the problem in Beth's action. As
a plot line, Steve's victim story is linear (Beth causes the action
sequence) rather than circular (they interact together in a way that
brings about the action sequence). Second, in Steve's story there is
no account of variation in Beth's (negative) character-the story is
intended to exemplify the problem, and within this story, there is
no account of how Beth does things that exemplify traits other than
those attributed here in the victim story (for example, "thoughtfulness" or "hardworking"). Beth is portrayed in this victim story as a
very flat character with little variation in her behavior or complexity in her character. Third, the values are portrayed as a very po13. McKenna describes Girard's work in a book that contains a section entitled,
"Tracing the Victim." ANDREW J. McKENNA, VIOLENCE AND DIFFERENCE 69-82
(1992).
14. The following case study is from a mediation session in southern California
(1995) (transcript on file with author). "Steve" and "Beth" are pseudonyms.
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larized (and polarizing) framework-Steve is advancing a moral
framework (totally consistent with the framework of mediation itself) that valorizes "respect" for others, exemplified by listening,
rather than flying off the handle, and "trust," rather than malicious
gossiping behind his back. Across all three dimensions of the narrative (plot, character roles, and values/themes), Steve's victim
story offers a "morality" in which there is little or no account of
how his actions may have prompted Beth's response, i.e., there is
no interdependence; Steve delegitimizes not only how Beth
behaves, but also who she is as a person.
Through the telling and elaboration of Steve's victim story, Beth
sighed, changed position in her chair, shook her head, muttered,
and made exclamations ("That is ridiculous!"). I persisted in my
efforts to witness Steve's pain, and elaborate his moral perspective,
asking Beth to monitor her upset feelings and if she got to a six (on
a one to ten scale) she should just leave the room, and I would call
her in when Steve was finished. However, I also told her that I was
sure that she would learn things she did not know, if she stayed,
and that she might need the subtlety of this information to "tell her
story." She stayed put.
Before she told her story, from her perspective, I asked her to
help me elaborate Steve's perspective:
SARA: I am sure it has been hard to sit and listen ....
BETH: Yes, it has, especially since ....
SARA: Wait a minute, before you start with your view, I want to
let Steve know that the problem is not one of not understanding-that you fully "understand" his viewpoint ... so I will ask
you a couple of questions that help him see that you are competent in his worldview .... Can you imagine with me, who, on
the staff, you think he has been most concerned would be vulnerable to this conflict between you and Steve?
BETH: Who I think he thinks ....
SARA: Yes.
BETH: Ummmmm, It would have to be Susan. She is a new and
very promising accountant on staff. He really wanted to bring
her on and thinks she is partner material eventually, and he will
be worried that this conflict, which is very visible, would scare
her away.
SARA: Do you share his view that Susan is worthy of supportthat she may indeed be partner material?15
15. This question was a strategic mistake on my part, as Beth had not yet been
witnessed, and, predictably, would use any opportunity to delegitimize Steve and
elaborate her perspective. So although the first question allowed her to demonstrate
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BETH: Well, of course I am worried that she may not be able to
stand up to him, but part of the support that I want to give her is
him, so she knows that this is a
to help her find her voice with
16
place where her views count.
SARA: OK. A second question, before you tell your story .... If
I were to ask Steve what he has done to try to reduce the tension, what would he tell me?
BETH: I think he would say that he tries to avoid me, that he
tries to avoid conflict, and that he has gone so far as to cut down
the frequency of the meetings, just to reduce the opportunities
for conflict between us. While I disagree with his method, I do
see that he has tried.
SARA: OK. Thanks for being willing to show him you are able
to take his perspective. Steve, I do not know if she hit the nail
on the head, but I do not want to take time at this point checking in with you-she needs to be able to give her perspective at
this point, so I will ask her to do that now. As I told her, if you
get to a six on a scale of one to ten, just leave the room, and I
will have an idea as to how you are faring. Otherwise, please try
and listen, so when I ask you to take her perspective, as she did
yours, you will be able to do so with some texture and precision.
OK Beth, let's hear your side of this ....

Beth proceeded to tell a victim story about how, over time, Steve
had become progressively more authoritarian, less collaborative,
and even secretive. She came to the firm, in the first place, because
she thought it was a place where she could grow and take on increasing responsibility for the firm, in an environment that was
competency in Steve's worldview, it would have been strategically better to end my
witnessing of his view with a question asking him to demonstrate competency in her
world view:
Steve, now that I think we know more of your perspective, and before Beth
has her chance to speak, I would like you to signal, if you can, that you are at
least a little familiar with her worldview, so I ask you this question: "Who in
the firm would you think Beth would say is most at risk as a function of this
conflict between the two of you?"
Answering this question requires him to put himself in her shoes before she begins
to speak, reducing the "work" she has to do to elaborate her worldview. Thus, although it was useful to ask her to speak from Steve's worldview, it might have been
better to ask him to do that, as he finished laying himself out as the victim. However,
in neither case would it have been useful to ask either one to then agree or disagree
with the other as to whether the other in fact got it "right" regarding who they were
the most worried about in the firm. Yet that is exactly what I asked Beth to do, with a
predictably bad result. Sharing my hindsight hopefully will help others to avoid this
mistake.
16. Inadvertently, I gave her an opportunity to delegitimize Steve. This followed
quite predictably from my question, which, as I mention supra note 15, was problematic, precisely because it opened the door to delegitimizing Steve.
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"human" as opposed to cut-throat ("like firms in L.A."). However, as her victim story notes, she has not been able to grow, as
Steve has become less and less willing to share decision-making
processes with her. As an example, she discussed with the staff the
possibility of expanding the staff kitchen area, so that a table could
be added. But before she had time to bring it to a partner meeting
(which Steve regularly cancelled or postponed), Steve had installed
bookcases that made the kitchen addition impossible. By her account, Steve had misrepresented himself to her and the firm, pretending to be open to others' participation. In fact, he was
unwilling to share power and information. Furthermore, he kept
others "down" by pretending that the firm was his family, which
made it difficult to address substantive differences that others may
have had with Steve. According to Beth, he positioned himself as a
"patriarch."
Through this discussion, Steve sat quietly, at times shaking his
head and making notes. When Beth was finished, I asked Steve if
he was willing to show Beth that he understood her perspective,
that he could walk in her shoes. He agreed to do this, so I asked
him:
SARA: Has there ever been a time in your life when you felt
17
somehow betrayed, or shut out?
STEVE: Well, I am not sure ....
I usually have good relations
with others ....
SARA: But relationships are never always perfect, so there has
been some point at which ....
STEVE: Well, I guess the closest I had to this experience was with
my older brother-he usually made unilateral decisions about
things we should do, in our group of friends. I was the younger
"tag-along" and although I almost always went along with him, I
was sometimes either worried I would not be able to keep up, or
resentful that it was not exactly what I wanted to do. So maybe
that is similar ....
SARA: And were you ever able to alter that pattern with him? It
is hard to do ....
STEVE: No, I was never able to change this, as he has always
been my older brother.
17. I was careful to use this relational language of "betrayal" which was not Beth's
word, but reflected the familial and relational view that Steve had of the problem.
Beth nodded when I asked the question, signaling her alliance with me, perhaps because I linked "betrayal" (Steve's familial language) with "shut out" (Beth's language
of "voice").
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In this exchange, I asked Steve to begin to elaborate the moral
framework that Beth had advanced (being inside or shut out of
decision-making), and interestingly enough, he used an example
from his family as a way to illustrate his experience. On the basis
of this example, combined with the complaint he had about Beth, I
surmised that Steve uses familial relations as a standard for assessing his professional relations with others. This may function in a
deterministic way, by restricting the roles that others can play with
him, as well as what roles he can play with others. In a private
conversation I had with Steve, he described his "fatherly" feelings
for Beth and Anne, and expressed hurt over Beth's unreasonable
behavior. He was using a father-daughter role set as a frame for
morally assessing Beth's behavior.
Beth experienced this, as Steve had often admonished her as if
she were a child, with a "you should know better" tagged onto
complaints he made about her work. This infuriated Beth and
made it much more likely that she would be, in her own words, a
"rebellious daughter" at the same moment she was trying to break
out of the father-daughter frame altogether. We discussed this in
front of Steve, and then I asked Beth what she would need to do to
really break free of the "rebellious daughter" frame.1 8 She indicated that she could write memos that detailed her concerns, adding them to the agenda for partner meetings. She also indicated
that she would not discuss Steve with Anne or any other staff
member, in an effort not to "rebel" by speaking badly about the
"father." We discussed these strategies in front of Steve, as ways to
help him remember that Beth was not his daughter.
In turn, I asked Steve whether he thought his role as "father"
was working and he indicated that, despite his comfort with that
role, it was not working. In fact, over time he wanted to "not have
to be the father" because he was hoping to put more and more
responsibility on other, younger partners. I asked him what he
could do to break his pattern of acting like a "father" and he suggested four things: 19 (1) that all partner business be discussed at
18. In a private session with me, Beth confessed that she was very frustrated with
herself for acting like a "rebellious daughter," as she had long thought of herself as a
very professional person.
19. These items emerged out of our interaction, so I played an important role in
organizing a collective inquiry into what had worked in the past and how he could

help it work in the future. Again, this kind of involvement is not, in my view, a sign of

"bias" (a concept that implies that a value-free framework is possible), but rather a
sign of the responsibility I take as a mediator for facilitating a quality of moral discussion that yields new plot lines, new roles, and new value sets. See Janet Rifkin et al.,
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partner meetings, not in informal settings between meetings; (2)
that he would take the notes at the meetings because this would
require him to listen and record the input of others; (3) that each
partner be assigned a functional role, so that at every meeting, each
partner would be in charge of reporting about work within their
domain and asking for input from other partners, yet with ultimate
responsibility for the area; and finally (4) he offered to pay for a
facilitator for the partner meetings for the next three months, hoping that if he got himself out of the role of convening and running
the meetings, there would be less conflict and more substance to
the discussion. These were very substantive suggestions that grew
out of our conversation about both the content and the process of
partner meetings.
Contrary to the dominant mediation ideology that mandates that
mediators attend to process without impacting the content of what
disputants say (about the nature of the problem or its solutions), I
was very involved in the emergence of this content, shaping questions and making comments that developed the options. However,
this did not mean that Steve was not involved-I interacted with
him in such a way that these options and this plan emerged. I
played a role, but did not originate these "solutions." To say that
these solutions were socially constructed means that they emerged
from the interaction between Steve and myself and that they rested
heavily upon the history of the conversation, both in the mediation
and prior to the mediation. It was my intention to favor versions of
"reality" that: (1) clearly established the suffering of each party; (2)
created descriptions of that suffering that connected it back to their
own actions, without minimizing the suffering or "blaming the victim"; (3) positively connoted the intentions of each actor, with
other actors; (4) created variation in character traits; and (5) added
complexity to the value sets in use, i.e., incorporating more and
different values.
This is a highly engaged mode of mediation practice that recognizes that mediators participate in the social construction of meaning, regardless of what questions they ask and what they do not
ask; regardless of whether they remain silent, or make summaries;
regardless of whether they actively reframe, or whether they simply repeat descriptions that disputants offer. This kind of engagement on the part of the mediator requires calibration with
disputants and careful ongoing observation of self-in-interaction.
Toward a New Discoursefor Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality, 9
(1991) (critiquing the notion of "neutrality").
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This kind of observation is consistent with the features von Foerster attributed to second-order systems in which the process of observing the conflict system brings forth the conflict system. z In
other words, the nature of the "reality" that is constructed is dependent upon the nature of the descriptions that "observers" make
of the system. This implies that mediation is a second-order process in which the mediator's interaction with others (elaborating
observations) impacts the evolution of the conflict, both by the
content of the conversation, as well as by the nature of the interaction in which that content emerges. This is a radical departure
from what could be called "first-generation" mediation practice,
where the mandate not to impact the content of the dispute is
thought to be essential to preserving the privilege the parties have
to define their own problems and build their own solutions. However, once we adopt an interactionist or social constructionist perspective, the mandate to separate content from process dissolves,
as mediators recognize the inevitability of their impact on the content of the dispute. This attention to the evolution of the content
calls for a "second-generation" mediation practice in which
mediators interact with disputants so as to evolve the conflict stories, reformulate relationships, reframe the past, and rebuild the
future. This second-generation mediation practice requires careful
attention to both the nature of the morality that is advanced in the
session, as well as the process by which it is advanced.
In this session, the morality that was advanced grew out of the
metaphors surrounding "father" and "rebellious daughter" rolesin our conversations, these roles were progressively defined as both
inappropriate and unworkable. Once the new normative stage was
set (the new moral frame created), Steve and Beth could work on
the agreement. After receiving compliments for their contributions, Steve and Beth signed an agreement that stipulated all the
suggestions each had made. They spent some time trying to discuss
the functional distribution of responsibility within the partnership,
until we realized that this was an agenda item for the next (facilitated) partner meeting.21 The session closed with an agreement.
Follow-up interviews with Steve and Beth (at one, three, and six

20. Heinz von Foerster, On Constructinga Reality, in THE

INVENTED REALITY

41

(Paul Watzlawick ed., 1984).
21. They asked me to facilitate the meeting and I declined; instead I referred
Steve and Beth to other professionals in my network.
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months) showed that there were still issues in the partnership, 2
neither Steve nor Beth felt that Steve was trying to function as a
father to Beth and neither felt that Beth was resorting to acting as
a "rebellious daughter." On the contrary, they felt that the pattern
between them had shifted radically and the quality of their relation
had improved. Rather than attribute this to the "magic" of mediation, I prefer to try and recount how we "traced the victim," and in
the process, elaborate the nature of moral discussion that distinguishes first- from second-generation mediation practice.
RETRACING MORALITY IN MEDIATION

Moral discussion in mediation often works against the very goals
of the first-generation mediation process-parties "tell their story,"
launching moral frames that provide the basis for their own legitimacy, while delegitimizing the Other. Paradoxically, mutual blame
is the outcome. From this perspective, value frames are tools that
parties use to position negatively the Other in discourse.23 As the
accounting firm case study shows, there is moral discussion in mediation; however, it only serves to reconstitute problematic relationships. Moral frames emerge and are deployed as weapons to
position the self as appropriate and the Other as inappropriate.
Following Girard, this kind of moral discussion does little to generate either law (social rules) or community, as there is nothing "sacred" in the act of mutual blame.24 On the contrary, in the process
of mutual blaming in which values are weapons, both sides refute
the victimization of the Other in a struggle to occupy the place of
the victim. It falls to the mediator to create what Girard calls a
"sacred" place by functioning as "witness" to victimization of both
sides.
A "sacred" place is one, according to Girard, that does more
than simply recount the victimization, in the presence of others-it
22. When I probed for the nature of the "issues," Beth explained that Steve found

it difficult to be one of three partners, and not the most important partner. So he
continually was "sneaking" into functional areas where he was not responsible, gathering information. Steve agreed to this description and explained it by noting that
during his many years as the sole partner, he had to do it all by himself, so he was not
used to working with others. Beth also used this frame, so that while they saw Steve as
behaving problematically, both saw it in the context of his past experience of being
the only partner, and both agreed that change was difficult.

23. B. Davies & R. Harrd, Positioning and Personhood, in POSITIONING
MORAL CONTEXTS OF INTENTIONAL ACTIoN

Lagenhove eds., 1999).
24. GIRARD, supra note 10, at 257-73.
25. Id.

THEORY:

32, 35-41 (Rom Harr6 & Luk van
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elevates violation of an individual to the level of the collective, as
others witness and elaborate the violation in public spaces. 26 What
happens to one person becomes something that reasonably happens to anyone,27 and thus the collective is itself at risk for similar
violations. Second, in the course of this public process, there is also
transformation of the victims-they become a symbol for the collective, a sign of both danger and immorality, signifying a practical
breach of security, as well as a moral breach of someone's social
obligation. The public story about how the violation occurred
functions to increase the security of the collective if strategies to
avoid future violations can be created; the public story about who
contributed to the violation and why it happened generates morality tales about how people should behave toward each other. It is
in this process, according to Girard, that the collective comes to
witness itself as a connected whole-relationships are affirmed, social norms created and acknowledged, and social harmony restored.28 Therefore, a place is "sacred" if it can create the
conditions for the victim to be recognized, for the victimization to
be accounted for, both practically and morally, and for social relationships to be anchored on that emergent morality. All of this
involves the creation of a space where the community can witness
itself as a community in which social obligations and norms
materialize.
But this act of witnessing is not a passive activity;2 9 on the contrary, this "witnessing" involves very active participation in the
evolution of narrative content. For example, both Steve and Beth
told stories that had very problematic features: 30 although each of
these stories functioned to display the speaker as the victim,
neither witnessed the victimization of the other. My role in the
session was to enable each person to see the other as the victim,
and in the process, build a new moral framework. So it is not only
26. Id. at 78-80, 269.
27. Accidents are not ritualized unless victims sue others for damages, in which
case the telling of the violation becomes a public process in a courtroom setting.
28. GIRARD, supra note 10, at 78-80, 258-67.
29. I define "active listening" as a very passive activity, for it does little to evolve

the content of the conversation. In fact, it continually anchors the very descriptions by
which each party delegitimizes the other.
30. For a description of the "better formed" story, see Carlos E. Sluzki, The "Better-Formed" Story: Ethics and Aesthetic Practice (unpublished manuscript on file with

author). Sluzki provides a normative framework for discriminating narratives that internalize personal responsibility and increase options, from narratives that reduce options and externalize personal responsibility. Here I am using Sluzki's normative

framework for assessing the evolution of conflict stories in mediation.
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that I functioned as a witness-I asked questions, created summaries, and made comments that enabled each party to witness the
other and to witness their own role in creating the conditions of
that victimization. In this case, Steve victimized Beth by treating
her as a daughter (Beth's story) and she responded by acting in a
rebellious fashion, confirming Steve's worldview, participating in
her own victimization, and victimizing Steve in the process. This
kind of "double witnessing" involves tracing the victim, as well as
tracing the role that each plays in the victimization of the other.
Double witnessing functions to create a set of doubled values-a
new value system emerges that is used by each party to understand
the new problem frame and there is a new set of meta-values,
which celebrate personal responsibility and reciprocity. In this mediation, a common value set emerged that defined familial relationships as inappropriate frames for navigating professional settings.
Treating a colleague as a daughter is unprofessional and acting like
a daughter is unprofessional. At the meta level, however, the act
of creating contributions toward the resolution of the conflict,
functions as a performative-it enacts personal responsibility and
reciprocity, materializing these values as second-order values, as a
morality for talking about morality. At this moment, community is
31
formed as new social rules emerge.
Like the great Wizard of Oz revealed behind the curtain, the
"magic" of mediation is revealed-shifts in relationships, which
themselves bear witness to shifts in how we see self and Other, are
not mysteriously produced by the mediation process itself, but by
the careful process of "double witnessing" in which both pain and
accountability emerge as features of the problem, and its solution
emerges via the evolution of the narratives that parties tell. By
implication, double witnessing requires that mediators themselves
own their participation, as witnesses who do not only reflect the
pain of parties, but also actively construct it, along with its link to
responsibility (the ability to respond). They must witness themselves as witnesses to others. While this definition of the role of
the mediator defies the injunctions to be "neutral," it does contribute to anchor a second-order morality that celebrates taking personal responsibility for mediators' participation in, and
accountability for, the nature of the community that is created in
31. I would differentiate these instances from those sessions where people simply
agree to stop doing what they are doing already, as is the case with international
cease-fires, for example. No new social rules are created; old social rules are simply
re-invoked, usually with little success.
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mediation, as well as the social norms and rules that frame that
community, as a community. Mediation is thus a very moral practice, and mediators are deeply implicated in the nature of the
moral worlds that emerge in sessions.
In the first-generation mediation practice, we learned that there
was a formula that could be useful for resolving conflicts. We
learned to bring parties to the table, to structure the process so
each side had a turn to speak, and to help parties invent options,
based on the elaboration of their interests. In the first-generation
practice, we practitioners clung to our belief that the process alone
could yield outcomes that not only resolved disputes, but also increased the humanity of those involved. We trusted "neutrality" as
well as the "ground rules" of turn-taking. We worked to witness
the pain of the parties and struggled not to tamper with the content
of their stories, as that was thought to constitute a violation of our
practice as "neutrals." However, as I have tried to show in this
essay, mediation is a moral practice at two levels: (1) it is about
moral frameworks, and (2) it advances a morality of personal responsibility and accountability as a way of dealing with others. If
we adopt this view, we then must let go of some of the assumptions
so central to first-generation mediation practice and embrace what
could be called a second-generation practice, in which we come to
witness the role that we as mediators play, with parties, in the social construction of moral frames for evaluating action past, present, and future.
In this second-generation practice we are not only freed from the
arbitrary constraints imposed by the secular discourse of mediation. We also are obligated to initiate ourselves into vocabularies
through which we can track our role as moral practitioners. Defining ADR as a "sacred" practice does not signal its link to a particular religious tradition, but instead calls attention to the
transformative capacity of the practice-through the transformation of victim stories, community is brought forth, enabling it to
bear witness to itself as a community, as a set of intertwined relationships. Defining ADR as sacred practice enables us, as practitioners, to witness the moral frames we contribute to create, both
in discrete sessions, as well as across our practice, over time.
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COURTS, LAWYERING, AND ADR: GLIMPSES
INTO THE ISLAMIC TRADITION
Walid Iqbal*

INTRODUCTION

The Qur'dn says, "And if two parties of the believers quarrel,
make peace between them; but if one of them acts wrongfully towards the other, fight that which acts wrongfully until it returns to
Allah's command; then if it returns, make peace between them
with justice and act equitably."' Accordingly, all historical evidence relating to the Islamic legal system consistently points to the
importance of sulh-compromise, settlement, or agreement between the parties to a dispute-invariably abetted by the court adjudicating such a dispute.
This essay focuses on sulh, which has its roots in an age-old Middle Eastern ritual. Under Islamic law, "[t]he purpose of sulh is to
end conflict and hostility among believers so that they may conduct
their relationships in peace and amity .... In Islamic law sulh is a
form of a contract ('akd), legally binding on both the individual
and community levels."2 Although the concepts of compromise,
settlement, reconciliation, and agreement-as encapsulated in
sulh-are not alien to the contemporary Western mind, the process
through which sulh is reached may differ in Western and Islamic
systems. In the modern day West, this process typically would involve the alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") mechanism
whereby regular courts are bypassed and a parallel set of institutions are called upon for assistance. In the Islamic tradition, regular courts and ADR mechanisms are essentially intertwined and,
historically, the legal systems that have relied on this traditional
* LL.M, Harvard Law School; LL.B., University of Punjab; M. Phil., University
of Cambridge; B.S., University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Iqbal is an Associate Attorney at
Sullivan & Cromwell in New York. The author wishes to thank Professor Frank Vogel, Director, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, and Salman
Akram Raja, Advocate of the High Courts of Pakistan, for directing the author to
certain sources cited herein. The views expressed in this paper are the author's own
and not those of his employer.
1. QUR'AN 49:9 in THE HOLY QUR'AN (M.H. Shakir trans., 1983), available at

http://www.hti.umich.edu/cgi/k/koran/koran-idx?type=DIVO&byte=811284.
2. M. Khadduri, Sulh, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM, NEW EDITION, VOL. IX,

at 845-846 (Clifford Edmond Bosworth et al. eds., 1997).
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model have dispensed justice much more efficiently than those departing from the Islamic spirit.
This essay first will examine the traditions of adjudication and
ADR in Islamic courts as revealed by seventeenth century Ottoman practice. This will serve as a basic model for the purposes of
an overall analysis. It then will review the success of the modern
day Saudi legal system, which is notable for its adherence to the
traditional Islamic model, and the failure of the modern day Moroccan system in its significant departure therefrom.
This essay concludes that an ADR mechanism is embedded in
the Islamic concept of dispensing justice through the traditional
emphasis on sulh, while Western-style lawyering runs counter to
the workings of such mechanisms.
THE OTTOMAN MODEL

3

Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed that the United States
Supreme Court "is a court of review, not a tribunal unbounded by
rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of individual expediency." 4 Justice
Frankfurter's view reflects the limited Western understanding of
the function of a kadi, an Islamic judge, as a character out of Arabian Nights, sitting in a mosque or under the shade of a tree and
dispensing justice as he deems fit. Instead, "the qadi, like his colleagues elsewhere, is often called upon to give substantive content
to principles that cannot be mechanically implemented" and "far
from being arbitrary or unsystematic, qadi justice partakes of regularities that not only run through the course of Islamic legal history
but also reveal the interplay of Islamic law and the societies in
'5
which it is rooted."
In light of the above, and in view of the fact that the kadi directly
or indirectly becomes the instrument through which settlement or
compromise, sulh, is achieved, it is important to understand the status, the methods of appointment, the functions, and the processes
and the procedures of the kadi court in the traditional seventeenth
century Ottoman system.
3. An extensive study of this system has been conducted in Ronald C. Jennings,
Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th Century Ottoman Kayseri, 48 STUDIA
ISLAMICA 133 (1978) [hereinafter Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure], and Ronald C.
Jennings, Limitations on the Judicial Powers of the Kadi in 17' Century Ottoman
Kayseri, 50 STUDIA ISLAMICA 151 (1979) [hereinafter Limitations].
4. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
5. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM 3 (2000).
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The Ottoman family stands out among many ruling dynasties because it honored the Islamic law tradition that grants special status
to the office of the kadi: although other officials depended solely
upon the sultan, or central ruler, for the source of their power, the
kadi could claim greater authority-divine, in addition to imperial-to enforce law within his domain. 6 Under the Ottoman system, every citizen had an inviolable right to the due process of law
and to a hearing in open court before an impartial judge.7 Every
citizen also was vested with certain basic rights-as rights ordained
by God-and no official could strip the citizen of these rights except in accordance with God's law.8
Under this system, the independence of the kadi was beyond
question. While the central or imperial authority appointed and
removed kadis, set administrative limits to jurisdictions, and regularly corresponded with kadis, it never interfered in the judicial
functions of the kadi's office. 9 The kadi had full discretion to apply
substantive and procedural laws to the cases before him and had
full independence to consider and admit evidence and to arrive at a
decision. 10 Although the court and police were separate institutions, kadis had full police cooperation and thus near-complete
power to enforce decisions.11 In short, Islam and the Ottoman Empire had brought forth "a court system in the early seventeenth
century that had noteworthy success in the realization of its ideals
12
of justice.'
Particularly important to our context is that kadi courts functioning under this system had a distinct preference for reconciliation
between parties rather than enforcement of a judgment. 13 Many
cases, especially those in which neither party was able to furnish
conclusive evidence, were settled by intervention and mediation of
the muslihun (upright Muslims at court).14 In this process, the parties to the suit reached sulh (settlement or compromise) on mutually acceptable terms and surrendered all rights to further claim on
the matter.1 5 In general, sulh had finality and could not be broken;
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure,supra note 3, at 133.
Id.
Id.
Limitations, supra note 3, at 151.
Id. at 152.
Kadi, Court, and Legal Procedure,supra note 3, at 141.
Limitations, supra note 3, at 157.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
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any subsequent suits brought
before a court on a settled sulh would
16
be rejected immediately.
Apart from this emphasis on reconciliation, the practices and
procedures of these kadi courts were otherwise uncomplicated.
They were aimed at ascertaining the truth and dispensing justice
through minimal involvement in procedural intricacies, once again
suggesting, in a Western sense, a preference for ADR rather than
strict adjudication.
First, although it was possible for both parties to name wakils, or
attorneys, to represent them in court, such wakils were seldom appointed. 17 Self-representation, supplemented when necessary with
guidance from the kadi on substantive and procedural legal issues,
was a more efficient and effective way of resolving disputes.
Second, the confrontation of the defendant by the plaintiff was a
fundamental element of the prevalent law, and the testimony of
reliable witnesses invariably was accepted at face value. 8 Upon
filing of the initial complaint, the defendant was asked to plead
innocent or guilty to the allegations made.' 9 If he admitted the
claim or pleaded guilty, the case was shut there and then and the
necessary order was passed in favor of the plaintiff.20 If the defendant denied the claim or pleaded innocent, then proof or witnesses
could be summoned. 2 ' The plaintiff was required to produce witnesses to prove his claim, and if he produced two reliable witnesses, the case was decided and his claim accepted. 2 If the
defendant wanted to call his witnesses first, he had to accompany
his denial with an affirmative statement contrary to the plaintiff's
claim.23 Hence, if the defendant at the very outset produced two
reliable witnesses in favor of his assertion, the court would reject
the claim of the plaintiff.24 Other forms of evidence only were admitted when there were no witnesses.
Third, oaths had key evidentiary status. When both parties to a
dispute were unable to produce witnesses or written evidence, then
either party could demand that the other swear an oath.26 It was
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 172.

at 172-73.
at 173.

at 176.
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first the right of the plaintiff to demand an oath of innocence from
the defendant.2 7 If the defendant took the oath, he was cleared of
all blame.28 If he refused, that in itself could not be held against
him. 9 Instead, he might demand an oath of the plaintiff, or else
the plaintiff had no case.3°
Fourth, courts employed an even less formal procedure in uncontested matters like the sale of land and homes, amicable settlement of estates, appointment of agents, registration of debts, and
numerous other business matters.3 ' In such cases, one party simply
had to acknowledge the claim in front of the other. 32 The acknowledgment could be in response to an earlier suit, but would serve as
testimony that both sides found the acknowledged outcome acceptable.33 The testimony of one party before another signified that
both parties were already in agreement and no rules of evidence or
other procedure needed to be employed. 34 It was not even necessary that the second party reply or comment on the testimony of
the first party, although in some cases the second party simply
would confirm the statement of the first party.
Finally, a kadi court was specially attentive to the parties appearing before it and conducted its proceedings in an atmosphere devoid of hostility:
While unbiased in its judgments, the.., court was personal in
its methods. Unlike the awesome impersonal judge of western
law, the kadi was in dialogue with the plaintiff and the defendant. No one hid behind the eloquence of lawyers. Every attempt was made to make unbiased decisions, but personality not
impersonality was the basis of the procedure.36
THE SAUDI SUCCESS

Present day Saudi Arabia is one of the few Muslim countries
with a legal system that largely adheres to the traditional Islamic
model. Based partly on the principles of the seventeenth century
Ottoman system enunciated in the previous section, and partly on
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 177.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 180.
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related Qur'anic teachings, Islamic legal maxims, and Saudi custom, "the great majority" or "99 percent" of all civil cases filed in
Saudi Islamic courts end in reconciliation.37 Saudis often quote the
legal maxim "sulh is best" that originated in the Qur'anic verse
suggesting amicable divorce for the ill-treated wife: "[I]t shall not
be wrong for the two to set things peacefully to rights between
38
them: for sulh is best.
In addition to its emphasis on reconciliation, the Islamic civil law
system in Saudi Arabia also adopts a somewhat informal approach
to trial. Consequently, the system is opposed to the introduction of
professional, Western-style attorneys or advocates into Islamic
courts. A wakil is allowed only as an agent or proxy (typically a
next of kin adult), appearing only in the absence of an actual party,
but not as counsel, pleader, or officer of the court. 39 Advocates of
this system believe that it ensures prompt and efficient resolution
of disputes in a direct and informal setting, invariably ending in
sulh.40 They believe that lawyers, on the other hand, use dilatory
tactics, add complexity to straightforward matters, distract the parties from their "moral obligations," and "subvert the moral mission
of the trial. '41 The system instead relies on the kadi as the proper
person to protect the parties from any unfair practice and to guide
them through the process of adjudication.
A typical trial in the Islamic court focuses on oral, rather than
written, proceedings and, at the very outset, the kadi asks the
plaintiff to present his claim and then requires the defendant to
reply.42 It is then the kadi who dictates an abbreviated version of
each statement into the record of the court.43 Although these
claims and counterclaims are not presented in the most orderly
fashion, the kadi's distillation, arrangement, and documentation of
the exchange highlight the relevant facts and home in on the real
issues. 44 Hence, the heart of the dispute is reached through a common-sense mechanism and the kadi does not need to employ any
formal procedure or rules of evidence. 45 An exception arises when
37. FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES
ARABIA 154 (2000).
38. QUR'AN 4:128, as translated in VOGEL, supra note 37, at 154.
39. Id. at 160.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 152.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 152-53.

OF SAUDI
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most facts enter the record through exchange and documentation
but a few remain disputed. In such a situation, the court may turn
to the formal evidentiary process. 6 In many cases, however, this
formal process is never commenced because the parties are able to
settle their dispute, inevitably with the help of the kadi.47 If reconciliation is reached, the kadi will, if the parties so desire, approve
their agreement, reflect it in the record of the court, and pass a
judgment for its performance.48 If the parties reconcile privately
and do not wish the case to become
part of the public record, the
49
plaintiff simply withdraws the suit.
Settlement lies at the heart of the practical adjudication process
in Saudi Arabia, not as a mere convenience, but as a basic norm.
Yet the agreement of parties cannot override God's law and sulh
only can yield outcomes that are permissible under such law. As
Caliph Omar 50 explained, "Compromise [sulh] is permissible between the people, except a compromise which would
make licit
51
that which is illicit or make illicit that which is licit."
Subject to the aforementioned limitation, Saudi jurists cite two
reasons for their emphasis on reconciliation. The first is that sulh
conveys "religious blamelessness" on the kadi and the parties.5
The second is that formal adjudication may breed hatred between
parties while reconciliation brings them together.53 This view finds
support in traditional Islamic law texts on the art of adjudication:
Caliph Umar is reported to have said, "Thrn away the litigants, in
order that they reach sulh,
because judgment creates feelings of
'54
spite among a people.
Kadis in the Saudi legal system are not mere adjudicators; they
possess great skills as mediators and conciliators. For example, if a
kadi believes that a settlement or compromise would yield a just
outcome, he will aim-sometimes even forcefully-to persuade the
parties before him to come to an agreement and settle their dis46. Id. at 153.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 154.
49. Id.
50. Caliph Omar was the second Caliph (religious leader or ruler) of Islam after
the death of the Prophet Mohammed. One of the "Rightly Guided" Caliphs, Omar is
known for his extensive interpretations of Islamic principles.
51. David S. Margoliouth, Omar's Instructions to the Kadi, J. ROYAL ASIATIC
Soc'Y 307 (Apr. 1910).

52.

VOGEL,

supra note 37, at 154.

53. Id. (describing an interview with Shaykh al-Muhanna, kadi of the Great Sharia
Court of Riyadh).
54. Id. at 154-55 (quoting 'ATWA, MUHADARAT, 37).
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putes amicably.55 Kadis do not rely on religious exhortations
alone, but also press practical considerations into service such as
that sulh may have advantages beyond religious benefits for both
parties in that it can avoid harsh outcomes. 6 As always, however,
the kadi must remain completely impartial, showing no more favor
to an affluent party than to an indigent one.57 He also must clarify
rather than direct.58
Despite all its perceived advantages, a major drawback of this
emphasis on sulh is that it may be abused by an inept, lazy, or
procrastinating kadi to cover up his shortcomings. 9 It also can
prevent a matter from being adjudicated under customary law that
could have lead to just solutions. Worse yet, sulh keeps kadis from
applying their minds to actual legal problems and principles, and
prevents them from being innovative and exercising independent,
interpretive judgment (iftehad) in complicated or novel cases.6°
This may lead to a dearth of sound substantive and procedural
rules addressing modern day problems.
THE MOROCCAN EXPERIMENT

The Moroccan legal structure, in contrast to Saudi Arabia's
traditional Islamic legal system, is a combination of Islamic law and
French and Spanish civil law systems. Although alternative dispute-processing mechanisms based on Islamic tradition exist in the
country at an informal level, nearly three decades ago Morocco established its own brand of alternative courts, which thwarted rather
than promoted the ends of justice and failed to win the confidence
of the public at all levels. 61 Examination of this botched attempt
reveals the fact that attempts at alternative mechanisms do not always succeed and are more likely to succeed if they are rooted in
the traditional Islamic spirit.
The structure of alternative courts was set up in Morocco
through laws passed in 1974.62 These courts were to function in
55. Id. at 156.
56. Id. at 156-57.

57. Id. at 158.
58. Id. "[The kadi] cannot suggest to one party a way of advancing his case, but he
can aid a plaintiff in making clear his claims, and he can intervene with the plaintiff on
behalf of the defendant seeking leniency or forgiveness." Id. (citing 'ATwA,
MUHADARAT, 110-11; al-OAR!, MAJALLAT, § 2074).
59. Id. at 157.
60. Id.
61. ROSEN, supra note 5, at 119-21.

62. Id. at 115-16 (citing Morocco's laws, Royaume du Maroc (1975a) and
Royaume du Maroc (1975b)).
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rural areas, apply local custom, decide matters involving small
amounts in dispute, and allow for no appeal against their decisions. 63 Their main objective was to provide speedy justice, to unburden the regular courts, and to stand for local beliefs and
ideals.64
Scholar Lawrence Rosen's "day in an alternative court" observations describe the alternative court, in overall appearance, to be a
mirror image of the regular court in all respects. 5 He found that
the court typically convened once a week with about a dozen cases
on the docket and was staffed by a judge (elected to a three-year
term by certain eligible members of the rural community) and two
experts possessing sound knowledge of local property and customs. 66 The court generally heard cases concerning rent, credit,
trespass, and other petty disputes involving property. Parties
presented their cases themselves instead of through counsel. 68
The court's dispensation of justice, however, fell far short of satisfactory. The slipshod manner in which cases were handled only
ensured speedy disposal, and almost every litigant was upset by the
judge's decision. 69 The judge did not apply local custom in any systematic manner, and the court was subjected to constant executive
interference.70 Studies of rural courts conducted over the course of
many years demonstrate that these were "themes" that were being
"repeated many times. "71
[These courts] do not, in fact, utilize local custom or any body of
recognized law and for that reason seem ... to have no recognizable process, nothing they can get a grip on, no point of attachment through which they can formulate their arguments or
draw on their connections and experience to configure a set of
supporting ideas and associations .... The rural courts fail by
cutting short the inquiry and issuing decisions that merely split
the difference so that both parties feel that they have not had
"their day in court. '"72
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.
68.

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 112-21.
Id. at 113-14.
Id. at 113.
See id. at 114-15.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 119-20.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 120-21.
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This system of alternative courts also was examined very closely
by the Moroccan legal community,73 which voiced more or less the
same set of concerns as the country's general populace: the laws
that instituted and regulated these courts suffered from vagueness
and led to the appointment of incompetent judges; there were no
safeguards against interference of the executive in judicial matters;
the laws to be applied by these courts were inadequately described;
and the absence of the appeals process had not simplified matters
in any way.74 The court systems in the traditional Islamic settings
described earlier would not have faced such criticisms.
Outside of these much criticized alternative courts, however, Islamic tradition has provided to Moroccans an effective set of mechanisms to address their actual or potential differences. These
involve, essentially, various types of individual or group intermediaries who can act as go-betweens to mend damaged relations between parties, request forgiveness or consideration,
arrange marriages, reconcile estranged spouses, and arrange amicable divisions of estates.75
These intermediaries, or "go-betweens," are called wasita, derived from a word that means "middle. ' 76 A wasita goes alone
without the petitioner to see the other party and typically is employed for the resolution of a dispute or to provide introduction to
a commercial client.77 Such intermediaries are used widely, so
much so that "they are to the proper functioning of society what
food is to the proper functioning of the body."7 8 A group of people
acting as intermediaries is referred to as 'ar and is normally employed by an individual to seek forgiveness or consideration from
the person petitioned. 79 Two other types of groups that may be
employed for more serious matters are the meshikha,80 a group of
pious or respectable people, and damen,8 1 who are guarantors in
business transactions.
The noteworthy aspect of these ADR mechanisms, borne from
the Islamic tradition, is that they provide the populace with a much
73. The League of Moroccan Attorneys held a symposium in 1976 to analyze the
new courts. Id. at 116.
74. Id. at 116-18.
75. Id. at 122-23.
76. Id. at 122.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 122-23.
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 124.
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more satisfactory solution to its problems than rural courts set up
through legislation.82
CONCLUSION

According to al-Sarakhsi, a noted Islamic scholar, dispensation
83
of justice "constitutes one of the most noble acts of devotion.
According to another scholar, Kasani, "It is one of the best acts of
devotion," and "one of the most important duties, after belief in
God. '8 4 These sayings are an acknowledgment of the extraordinary responsibility of the kadi or Islamic judge in the multiple roles
he plays as an adjudicator, mediator, and conciliator.
An ADR mechanism is embedded in the Islamic concept of dispensation of justice through the traditional emphasis on sulh. This
is highlighted by the procedures and processes employed in traditional Islamic systems of the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire
as well as the present day Saudi Arabia. The failure of modern day
Morocco's alternative court system could be attributed, among
other things, to its departure from the traditional Islamic spirit.
Unfortunately, our examination of the traditional models also
leads to another unequivocal conclusion-that Western-style lawyering runs counter to the Islamic notion of ADR, and, with the
blessing of the parties, it is the kadi, and the kadi alone, whose
"work is crucial to the determination of truth, administration of
justice, and maintenance of peace in our society."85

82. Id. at 123.
83. Emile Tyan, Judicial Organization, in LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST 243 (Majid
Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesney eds., 1955) (citing SARAKHSI, AL-MABSUT, VOL.
XVI, at 67 (1324) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
84. Id. (citing KASANI, BADAI AL-SANAI Fl TARTIB AL-SHARAI, VOL. VII, at 4
(1910) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85. Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement. An Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1082
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PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
AND ZEALOUS REPRESENTATION
Randall G. Styers*

In 1991, the theologian Stanley Hauerwas published an article
with a startling title: The Politics of Justice: Why Justice is a Bad
Idea for Christians.' The question I will address is whether a lawyer can zealously represent a client without violating the lawyer's
religious or humanistic beliefs. Hauerwas's perspective on the notion of justice raises a number of issues relevant to our consideration of this question.
At first glance, the question of zealous representation would
seem rather extraneous to many American Protestants, particularly
given the historical role of Protestantism in shaping the nation's
political and legal institutions, and the powerful traditions in Protestant thought that have worked to cordon issues of faith away
from our economic and professional lives. Yet a growing number
of contemporary Protestant theologians have come to question the
degree to which the Christian faith can be reconciled with the values of the broader American political and legal system.2
Hauerwas's perspective on the issue of justice is indicative of this
trend, and we will benefit from considering the logic underlying his
viewpoint. After introducing this perspective, I will turn to consider more directly its bearing on this question, and some of the
issues to which it points us.
Stanley Hauerwas is one of the most prominent and controversial Protestant theologians in America today. He has written extensively on the relation of the Christian church to liberal society,
with the brunt of his criticism directed against the ways that establishment Christianity, in both its liberal and conservative varieties,
* Randall G. Styers is Assistant Professor of the Philosophy of Religion at
Union Theological Seminary in New York. He is a graduate of Yale Law School, Yale
Divinity School, and the Duke University Graduate Program in Religion. His research and teaching address modern Western philosophical discourses on religion,
with particular focus on the application of contemporary critical philosophy and social
theory to the study of Christianity.
1. STANLEY HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice: Why Justice Is a Bad Idea for
Christians,in AFTER CHRISTENDOM? 45, 45-68 (1991).
2. See generally THEOLOGY AFTER LIBERALISM: A READER (John Webster &
George P. Schner eds., 2000); STANLEY HAUERWAS, A Christian Critique of Christian
America, in CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY 171, 174-80 (1988).
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has accommodated itself to the broader culture.3 As Hauerwas explains, this accommodation has been spurred largely by the desire
of many Christians to exercise influence-and control-over political power.4 He argues that in their enthusiasm for political power
and its attendant benefits, American Christians "have failed in
[their] responsibility to this state by domesticating the Gospel
....
,,5The church has become so engaged in the task of legitimating the liberal American state that it has lost sight of its own distinctive character and values.
In response, Hauerwas argues, the church should more properly
see itself as standing in a position of critical opposition to all forms
of political power and the violence with which that power is maintained.6 Protestant (and, increasingly, Catholic) Christianity has
compromised that oppositional status by acquiescing to the role of
a civil religion, 7 becoming "a court religion held captive to the interests of a nation-state." 8
3. See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD
A CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 11-12 (1981); STANLEY HAUERWAS,
AGAINST THE NATIONS: WAR AND SURVIVAL IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY 17-19 (1985).
Hauerwas tempers his critique of liberal democracy with acknowledgment of liberalism's achievements, particularly with regard to the imposition of limitations on state
power "in order to encourage public cooperation for the maintenance of good community." Stanley Hauerwas, Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up? 44 THEOLOGY TODAY
93 (1987).
4. Hauerwas rejects "the very idea that Christian social ethics is primarily an
attempt to make the world more peaceable or just." Instead, he asserts that "the first
social ethical task of the church is to be the church-the servant community ....
[W]hat makes the church the church is its faithful manifestation of the peaceable
kingdom in the world. As such the church does not have a social ethic; the church is a
social ethic." STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER ON
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 99 (1983).
5. Stanley Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion: A Subtle Temptation, 72 SOUNDINGS
317, 318 (1989).
6. See HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER, supra note 3, at 12. "The
church does not exist to provide an ethos for democracy or any other form of social
organization, but stands as a political alternative to every nation, witnessing to the
kind of social life possible for those that have been formed by the story of Christ." Id.
See generally STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, WHERE RESIDENT
ALIENS LIVE: EXERCISES FOR CHRISTIAN PRACTICE 11-28 (1996) (describing Christians as "resident aliens" and the church as a colony or island among other cultures);
Anthony B. Robinson, The Church as CounterculturalEnclave, 107 (23) THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 739, 739-41 (1990). On the central role of pacifism in Hauerwas's critique of the liberal nation-state, see Hauerwas, Will the Real Sectarian Stand Up?,
supra note 3, at 93-94; HAUERWAS, AGAINST THE NATIONS, supra note 3, at 127; John
Milbank, Critical Study, 4 MODERN THEOLOGY 213 (1988).
7. Hauerwas, Freedom of Religion: A Subtle Temptation, supra note 5, at 321.
8.Id. at 319.
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It is in this context that Hauerwas questions the prominence
given to the rhetoric of justice by Christian theologians and
ethicists. Hauerwas begins his essay on the politics of justice by
underscoring the widespread agreement among contemporary
American Christians that justice is a central theological value. 9 A
generic language of justice and rights has come to shape Christian
social witness so deeply as to displace any alternative idiom. 10
Hauerwas is skeptical of this rhetoric, cautioning that contemporary invocations of justice actually may serve to "underwrit[e]
presuppositions about social life that are incompatible with how
Christians are taught to regard and care for one another.""
Through the course of this essay, Hauerwas raises a number of important questions about the notion of justice. I will mention just a
few most relevant to the consideration of whether zealous representation is compatible with religious belief.
Hauerwas's central argument is that abstract appeals to justice
commonly take either the form of empty generalities, or are filled
with content that Christians properly should question.' 2 Liberal
political theory itself has great difficulty giving meaning to abstract
notions of justice, often vacillating between competing claims of
equality and liberty.' 3 Despite the regular invocation of abstract
generalities by political theorists and theologians, any substantive
account of justice must necessarily be "tradition-dependent"-the
product of a concept of right relations drawn from a comprehensive moral tradition. 4 And to the extent that our substantive visions of the good differ, it may well be the case that we do not
"share enough to even know what justice might mean." 5
Many American Christian ethicists have worked to develop general accounts of justice in the attempt to remain responsible social
actors without resorting to specifically Christian principles. 6 But
in the search for widely-acceptable common ground, these attempts often revert, sometimes inadvertently, to the ideals of Enlightenment-inspired liberal political theory, most notably, its
9. HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice, supra note 1, at 45.
10. Id. at 46.
11. Id. at 48; Hauerwas, Should Christians Talk So Much About Justice?, 14 BOOKS
& RELIGION 4, 14-15 (1986).
12. HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice, supra note 1, at 45-47.
13. Id. at 47-48.
14. Id. at 49.
15. Id. at 49, 60.
16. Id. at 58. Hauerwas calls this effort "the contemporary equivalent of a natural
law ethic." Id.
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individualism.17 It has become difficult to speak about justice without using a language thoroughly shaped by modern liberal presuppositions about human identity and social order. And more
insidiously, allegiance to this liberal notion of justice actually bolsters the coercive power of the nation-state.18 These efforts by
Christian ethicists "have the ironic effect of reinforcing state
power, or more accurately, reifying a particular form of state
power that Christians should rightly challenge." 19
As Hauerwas states, "[W]e say we want justice but I suspect
even more that we want power-power to do good, to be sure, but
power just the same."' 20 He argues not that Christians should, or
could, seek always to avoid power, but rather that one of the most
significant problems with liberal accounts of justice is that they
often serve to mask issues of power: "[T]he very form of liberty
itself may only hide forms of domination. The question
is not
'21
whether to have or not to have power, but to what end.
Hauerwas turns to the work of Michael Ignatieff for a further
important challenge to the liberal notion of justice.22 As Ignatieff
argues, the problem with most contemporary political philosophy is
not merely that it is individualistic, but rather, in Hauerwas's
words, "[T]hat in the absence of any account of the good, individuals are led to believe that all their needs are legitimate. Justice,
thus construed, leads to efforts to create societies that are free of
constraints upon the needs of its members. '23 The effort to meet
these unconstrained needs leads to ever-growing forms of violence
and domination. 24 Yet in their zeal to conform to the broader culture, Christians settle for mere procedural accounts of justice in
which all private versions of the good are equally viable, rather
than offering a critical and substantive account of the good.
17. Id. at 52-53.
18. Id. at 48.
19. Id. at 58.
20. Id. at 60.
21. Id. at 60-61.
22. Id. at 61 (citing MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE
(footnote omitted).
23. Id. Hauerwas also quotes LESLIE NEWBIGIN,
GOSPEL IN WESTERN CULTURE

NEEDS OF STRANGERS

(1985))

FOOLISHNESS TO GREEKS: THE

27 (1986) stating that "since the pursuit of happiness

is endless, the demands upon the state are without limit. If, for modern Western people, nature has taken the place of God as the ultimate reality with which we have to
deal, the nation-state has taken the place of God as the source to which we look for
happiness, health, and welfare." Id. at 66.
24. See HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice, supra note 1, at 61-62.
25. Hauerwas, Should Christians Talk So Much About Justice?, supra note 11, at
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Without a fundamental sense of human community and a shared
sense of good, we are left with a bleak prospect for any form of
substantive justice in the regime of the liberal state.
In Hauerwas's view, an appropriate Christian language of justice
would apply not so much to political and social institutions, as to
character: contrary to the assumptions of liberalism, it is impossible
to have "a just social system without people being just. '26 In contrast to the rhetoric of individual autonomy and freedom that animates liberal conceptions of justice, Hauerwas asserts that
Christianity teaches a radically different norm:
[A] life freely suffers, that freely serves, because such suffering
and service is the hallmark of the Kingdom established by Jesus.
As Christians we do not seek to be free but rather to be of use,
for it is only by serving that we discover the freedom offered by
God.2 7

The liberal notion of freedom as autonomy is countered by a Christian notion of freedom that "literally comes by having our self-absorption challenged by the needs of another. '28 Adopting the
language of justice and liberation as central to Christianity leads to
the risk that "the distinctive witness of the church can be unwittingly lost. ' 29 Although Christians might adopt pragmatically the
liberal language of contemporary democratic society, they always
must be mindful of the limits of such rhetoric and vigilantly maintain their primary moral identity as Christian believers.3 °
As Hauerwas concludes:
In the interest of working for justice, Christians allow their
imaginations to be captured by concepts of justice determined
by the presuppositions of liberal societies, and as a result, contribute to the development of societies that make substantive
accounts of justice less likely. Out of an understandable desire
to be politically and socially relevant, we lose the critical ability
to stand against the limits of our social orders. We forget that
the first things as Christians we have to hold before any society
is not justice but God ....
Attempts to ground justice in abstract
26. Id. at 15. Hauerwas continues: "The attempt to create such systems end in
creating greater state power in the name of doing justice." Id.; see Stanley Hauerwas,
The Church and Liberal Democracy: The Moral Limits of a Secular Polity, in A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER, supra note 3, at 73.
27. HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice, supra note 1, at 53-54.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 55.
30. RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, S.J., NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY: 1981
THROUGH 1984, at 23-25 (1984).
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rights and/or contractual agreements can only result in ideal theories that distort our moral capacity even further. As Christians
we will speak more truthfully to our society and be of greater

service by refusing to continue the illusion that the larger social
order knows what it is talking about when it calls for justice.3 1

There is much to be said about Hauerwas's view of Christianity
and the liberal state. As I noted above, his theological perspective
is quite controversial. 32 And the great majority of Christian theologians, particularly theologians developing theological resources
for alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), find the language of
justice essential to their tasks.33 Yet Hauerwas's fundamental critique of Enlightenment liberalism and its values is echoed by a
large number of contemporary Protestant theologians across the
political and theological spectrum, 34 and this critique of liberal val31. HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice, supra note 1, at 68.
32. Recurrent major lines of criticism of Hauerwas' work include the following.
(1) Some critics argue that he is insufficiently attentive to the pluralism and conflict
within various Christian traditions. E.g., John D. Barbour, The Virtues in a Pluralistic
Context, 63(2) THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION 175, 177-78 (1983); William Daniel Cobb,
Pluralism and Ethics: Toward a Reconstruction of Value, 47(4) ENCOUNTER 309, 318
(1986); Linell E. Cady, Foundation vs. Scaffolding: The Possibility of Justificationin an
HistoricistApproach to Ethics, 41(2) UNION SEMINARY Q. REV. 45, 52-53 (1987). (2)
Some argue that he offers an unpersuasively static and bifurcated view of the relation
between the church and the world. E.g., Robinson, The Church as Countercultural
Enclave, supra note 6, at 740-41; Milbank, CriticalStudy, supra note 6, at 214-15. (3)
Some find his account of how theological critique and change occur within the church
to be inadequate. E.g., Todd Whitmore, Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianismin
Christian Ethics: A Critiqueof Stanley Hauerwas,in THE ANNUAL OF THE SOCIETY OF
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 207, 208-13 (D.M. Yeager ed., 1989). (4) Finally, some seek a more
detailed account of the virtues involved in the relations of the church to the broader
political community. E.g., Lee H. Yearley, Recent Work on Virtue, 16(1) RELIGIOUS
STUDIES REVIEW 1, 7 (1990); Whitmore, supra note 32, at 215-19; Milbank, supra note
6, at 214.

33. For an overview, see generally MEDIATION AND FACILITATION TRAINING
MANUAL: FOUNDATIONS AND SKILLS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 11-40 (Jim Stutzman & Carolyn Schrock-Shenk, eds. 3d ed. 1995), and the works
cited therein. See generally HUGH F. HALVERSTADT, MANAGING CHURCH CONFLICT
(1991); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN
DIVIDED SOCIETIES (1997); RUPERT RosS, RETURNING TO THE TEACHINGS: EXPLORING ABORIGINAL JUSTICE (1996); WALTER WINK, THE POWERS THAT BE: THEOLOGY
FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM (1998); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES (1990). For

other recent defenses of the notion of justice, see generally

SUSAN MOLLER OKIN,

26-33 (1989); John Tomasi, IndividualRights and
Community Virtues, 101 ETHICS 521, 521-36 (1991).
34. See generally JOHN MILBANK, THEOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY: BEYOND SECJUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY

ULAR REASON (1990); RADICAL ORTHODOXY (John Milbank et al. eds., 1999); THE
POSTMODERN GOD: A THEOLOGICAL READER (Graham Ward, ed. 1997); THEOLOGY
AFTER LIBERALISM: A READER, supra note 2.
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ues raises a number of issues central to the question at hand. I will
focus briefly on three.
First, it is difficult to imagine lawyers abandoning the language
of justice, particularly given its rhetorical and persuasive value in
the broader efforts to represent our clients. Hauerwas himself acknowledges the value of an ad hoc invocation of the rhetoric of
justice. But at the very least, Hauerwas presses us to consider
exactly what we might mean by that language.36 He underscores
the emptiness of much of the generic language of justice,37 and he
cautions us particularly against the fallacy of thinking that a notion
such as justice-or zealous representation-could be given meaningful content in the abstract.38
Any substantive response to either notion requires concrete engagement in the context of immediate relationships. So, for example, in the proper situation, the most morally appropriate type of
legal representation actually will be representation that serves to
heighten or escalate conflict. In many circumstances, conflict is essential to the task of building peace. 39 There can be no abstract
answer to the question of the propriety of zealous representation;
any meaningful response will depend on the concrete factors of
specific situations.
Second, as we work to give content to these notions of justice
and appropriate representation, we err if we see them as primarily
procedural. In fact, Hauerwas strongly cautions us against seeing
40
the legal system and its procedures as fundamentally benign. If
we imagine justice as merely a matter of procedure, effective and
zealous representation of a client easily can devolve into the naked
and aggressive exploitation of those procedures to accomplish the
client's objectives. Suffice it to say that a slavish devotion to procedure can mask enormous substantive evil.
But, in fact, it is very difficult to imagine a morally responsible
lawyer who could have such a constricted view of their responsibilities in representing a client. As we consider the nature of zealous
35. Hauerwas, Should Christians Talk So Much About Justice?, supra note 11, at

15, (citing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENCE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY (1983) as an useful example of more modest invocation of the concept of
justice).
36. Id. at 14.
37. Id.

38. Id. at 14-15.
39. For various theological materials, see generally MEDIATION
TION TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 33.
40. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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representation, Hauerwas demands that we reposition justice
within a much broader constellation of theological and moral values.4 Christian theology teaches not a justice that is primarily procedural, but rather one that is substantive to its core.42 What is
important in human life is not just the protection of abstract rights
or procedural equality-surely the lowest common denominator of
an atomized society. Although there is an important place for that
minimal standard, a place that Hauerwas perhaps underestimates,
Christianity teaches that the objective of our labor should be a
community in which each member flourishes, with our individual
and collective goals shaped by mutuality and commitment.43
This perspective harmonizes particularly with methods of ADR.
The ADR movement is motivated in large measure by an awareness of the limitations of traditional adversarial models of conflict
resolution. At its very best, ADR seeks to open a space for "transformative peacemaking '44 in which we can build more substantive
and mutually beneficial relationships.
Third, Hauerwas points us away from a vision of justice as freedom from constraint on our desires and toward more substantive
notions of justice that inevitably will teach that some desires are
worthy and that others are destructive.46 As advocates, each of us
has had the opportunity to recognize that not all our clients' professed interests are equally meritorious. Clients' most pressing and
visible short-term goals sometimes run counter to their long-term
objectives. The passions of the moment can hide more comprehensive interests, interests that inevitably will involve a broader vision
of the client's position within a wider community. One of the most
important responsibilities of an attorney is to aid the client in maintaining a view of this bigger picture. In other settings, Joseph Allegretti has spoken of the attorney-client relationship as
constituting a moral community,47 and within that community,
even in the midst of the most zealous representation, the attorney
has an important opportunity to recall the client to this broader
41. HAUERWAS, The Politics of Justice, supra note 1, at 58-60, 68.
42. See id. at 58-68.
43. Id.
44. E.g., Larry Dunn, Mennonite Peacemaking and Conflict Transformation, in
MEDIATION AND FACILITATION TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 33, at 17.
45. Id. at 15-18.
46. See generally Hauerwas, Should Christians Talk So Much About Justice, supra
note 11, at 14-15.
47. Joseph Allegretti, Lawyers, Clients, and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on
Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1121-23 (1998).
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view, to help the client articulate a vision of substantive and mutually beneficial justice.
Again, this perspective fits well with alternative dispute resolution methods. For example, mediation procedures often are designed to move participants beyond their immediate positions
toward recognizing and articulating their more substantive interests and values. In this process, positions can alter as participants
reflect more deeply on their ultimate objectives.
Thomas Shaffer has stated that religion always should be "a challenge to the comfort of lawyers."48 Stanley Hauerwas reminds us
that even the most cherished legal and social ideals can be challenged by our faith.4 9 It is surely possible to represent our clients
zealously without violating our religious and moral beliefs, but in
doing so we will find no comfort in platitudes.

48. Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith Tends to Subvert Legal Order, 66 FORDHAM L.
1089, 1099 (1998).
49. Hauerwas, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?. , supra note 1, at 19-20.
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FAITH AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
A RESPONSE*
Louis A. Craco**
On November 1, 1945, my father, one of the prominent auctioneers of the day, sold a picture at auction for the highest price that
had ever been fetched for an oil painting in the history of the
world, a paltry $375,000. The event, which was vivid in our family
history, came to mind in the course of preparing for this Dialogue
today. You can go up a few blocks to the Frick Collection and see
the painting yourself. There it is, one of the several early renditions by El Greco of the "Purification of the Temple," showing
Christ, in full cry with knotted cords raised above him, driving the
money changers from the temple. According to Saint Matthew,
Christ said, "Do you not know that my Father's house is a house of
prayer? And you have made it a den of thieves."'
It is pure advocacy. He states a claim of another, His Father, in
righteousness, and forcefully asserts it against those who intrude
upon it unjustly.
I thought of this because it seems to me not at all clear that I can
avoid the role of being a skunk at the garden party. Having eaten
well of our hosts' crullers and coffee, and recognizing the dedication of CPR to the pacific resolution of disputes, I want to present
a different point of view for a moment and suggest what I think is
missing in what I have heard so far today. I want to respond from
the standpoint (that Matt Boylan and Jack Weiser and some other
people here in the room will recognize as an Ignatian insight) of
discerning that our faith must work in the world as it is.
Now to do that, I am afraid you will have to indulge my being
personal. I think it is right, as one of our prior speakers said, that
* These remarks were given extemporaneously in response to the panelists at
the Dialogueon the Practice of Law and Spiritual Values, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 991
(2001). Only slight editorial changes have been made and footnotes added in order to
clarify the speaker's comments for the reader.
** Louis A. Craco is a Senior Partner at Willkie, Farr & Gallagher. He holds a
bachelor's degree from Holy Cross and a law degree from New York University. Mr.
Craco is Chair of the New York State Judicial Institute on Professionalism in the Law.
He served as President of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and as
Chair of the New York Court of Appeals Committee on the Profession and the
Courts. He also has served often as an arbitrator or a mediator, including as a member of the New York Regional Panel of CPR.
1. Matthew 21:13.
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we have to give witness, we have to give testimony. 2 And the witness and testimony that a responsible Christian gives is not so
much what he or she says, not even so much what he or she does,
but what he or she is. So you will forgive me if I take a stance that
is somewhat personal.
I think that I am trying to do what Professor Allegretti talks
about when he speaks of a vocation. 3 It may be that after forty-five
years of litigation practice in New York City-in the courts of this
state and in others, and having been given the opportunity to think
and talk seriously about professionalism at the highest levels of the
New York State legal system-I am invited-called-to think
about what professionalism might be at its most meaningful. It
may be simply that I have read Ulysses, I mean Tennyson's poem,
too many times and think "Something ere the end, Some work of
noble note, may yet be done." 4 But let me try anyway.
I do not want you to hear me to say that I disrespect in any way
the massed consensus of monotheistic religions of the world and of
ethical humanism that peace is better than combat. On the contrary, as I read the conference papers furnished to us in advance, I
must tell you I was moved beyond anything that I have read recently by any spiritual writer, by Baruch Bush's paper, which in its
fullness-which he had not the opportunity to provide in his remarks-is a transcendently beautiful conception of the role of the
peacemaker.5 But what I do fear in the emerging interest in religion and the law is an emerging orthodoxy about the relationship of
religion and the law. It is a view that depends in some respects on
generalizing from marginal practitioners of the law depicted in
cartoons as hired guns, on the one hand, and talking about obvious
propositions like the assertion that peace is better than war, on the
other. That leaves the 165,000 New York lawyers6 who work out
their salvation as well as their livelihood, every day serving clients
without much guidance or, I fear, hope.
2. Sara Cobb, CreatingSacred Space: Toward a Second-GenerationDispute Reso-

lution Practice, 28

FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 1017 (2001).

3. Joseph Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution,

28

FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 997 (2001).

4. ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, Ulysses, in TENNYSON'S POETRY 52, 53 (Robert W.
Hill Jr., ed. 1971).
5. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and ADR: Insights From the Jewish Tradi-

tion, 28 FORDHAM
6. See ETHICS

URB.

L.J. 1007 (2001).

INST. SUBCOMM., N.Y. STATE JUDICIAL INST. ON PROFESSIONALISM IN THE LAW, REPORT OF TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY PROFESSIONALISM AND
CONDUCT 9-10 (May 1998) (noting that New York State is the second largest bar in

the United States).
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So let me tell you a little bit where I come out on this. This may
not be an "Archimedean point" from which to examine the questions we have been discussing7 (although in other contexts I am
precisely suggesting that it is), but it is my point of reference on the
question of virtuous lawyering.
When you examine them seriously, the keynotes of American
professionalism are two. First, it is a helping profession. It offers
assistance to persons in need and invites reliance on special skill
and judgment. And second, it is radically a public profession. I do
not care whether you are doing a contract in the offices of Sullivan
& Cromwell, or something equally private, or whether you are in
court. You are employing the coercive force of the state to give
meaning to what you do. You are invoking the public law, even in
private transactions. There are implications-which are well beyond the seven minutes that I am allowed today-that flow from
those two things.
I want to talk for a moment only about the second, the nature of
American law as a public calling. I emphasize that this is an American characteristic. American lawyers are called, I would argue, to
manage the tensions that are built into the American experiment,
built as that experiment is on a whole series of great oxymorons.
"Ordered liberty." "One from many." We have as our fundamental task the continuous adjustment of those tensions in the culture.
We do it by a process that, in a new book that just came to my desk
today from CPR containing think pieces on various aspects of
lawyering, Mr. Piazza correctly identifies as a Hegalian dialectic of
thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.8 We do it by assertion and defense
and adjudication of claims of right, claims of justice.
We manage those tensions, many very fundamental, and manage
those assertions of claims and defenses against them, many very
important to the parties or the public, by a process that avoids
achieving resolution the way they did in Serbia. That is no small
achievement.
This is a distinctive role for the American lawyer and that in turn
exposes a distinction that is important from some of the things that
we have heard today. The American lawyer's role is distinctive be7. Cobb, supra note 1.
8. Antonio C. Piazza, Mediation v. Litigation, in Into the 21st Century: Thought
Pieces on Lawyering, Problem Solving and ADR, 19 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST
LITIG. 55 (2001). Into the 21st Century was a special book-length issue of the CPR
Institute for Dispute Resolution's newsletter Alternatives to the High Cost of
Litigation.
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cause of America's heterogeneity, and because we hold ourselves
out as including the "other," not expelling the "other." And, consequently, the law, and the characteristics and ethos of the law
from which the ethics of law flow, have to take into account the
fact that we are not a homogeneous community like biblical Israel
or seventeenth century Ottoman Turkey or Saudi Arabia or the
Corinth of Saint Paul. We have, as the last speaker said, trippingly,
but vitally, "vacillating . . . claims of equality and liberty" with
which we have to deal always. 9
We deal with them largely through the adversary system. That is
meant to provide an alternative system to strife or the expulsion of
the "other." Those of you who came here from Westchester may
well have come down the Hutchinson River Parkway, tracing the
route Anne Hutchinson traveled when she dealt with her difference with the Massachusetts Bay community by getting the hell out
of there. 10 We no longer have to do that. We have not the space
for either opportunity or difference to be accommodated by setting
up shop someplace else. And as our society becomes more heterogeneous, as our Islamic populations grow, as communities of color
grow, as immigration grows, these demands and tensions will be
greater, not fewer. The implication of this is that we must recognize the adversary system for what it fundamentally and philosophically is-an alternative system to strife or the exclusion of others.
It is a peacekeeping system.
Now I recognize that there is available, and indeed made by
Hauerwas and others, a systematic, radical (and I mean that in its
root sense) attack both on the American liberal democratic experiment itself and then on the adversary system as an adjunct of it. 1 I
do not mean either to deprecate the rightness of bringing those
questions up or their relevance to another discussion than this one.
What I do mean to say is that the adversary system has a place,
indigenous to the United States, which is honorable and is capable
of being carried out with virtue.
9. Randall G. Styers, Protestant Perspectives on Justice and Zealous Representation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1047 (2001).
10. CHRISTINE
WOMEN'S RIGHTS

A. LUNARDINI, SOCIAL ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY SERIES:
13-14 (1996) (explaining that Hutchinson's banishment from the

Massachusetts Bay Colony eventually resulted in her move to New York).
11. STANLEY M. HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY: ESSAYS ON
CHURCH, WORLD AND LIVING IN BETWEEN 171-90 (1988); STANLEY M. HAUERWAS,
AFTER CHRISTENDOM?: HOW THE CHURCH IS TO BEHAVE IF FREEDOM, JUSTICE,
AND A CHRISTIAN NATION ARE BAD IDEAS 45-68 (1991).
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I also do not mean to be heard as saying that I defend the abuses
of the adversary system. I really was delighted that Mr. Iqbal was
able to answer with candor what is absolutely true of my experience, 12 that every day in my firm people are told how to behave
well. The first thing we do when we get new lawyers into the firm
is take them away for a week and drum it into their heads that we
care that they behave well-behave well in the adversary system
and in the negotiation processes that they will engage in. It is simply an irresponsible abdication of the real question before us to
think that the abuses are the practice. They are not.
When you asked the question, Professor Pearce, about Luban's
criticism of the so-called "standard" model 3 for running contrary
to the teachings of Christianity, 4 I whispered to Jack Weiser that I
did not so much think it was against Christianity as it was against
the facts. The standard model of practice as described by Luban,
who of course has his own radical agenda to propose, is simply not
the standard practice we see every day. Indeed, if I were to pick
out an abuse of the adversary system that I think is the gravest of
our abuses, it is none of the ones that you heard about today. I
think the biggest abuse of the adversary system is its systemic failure to provide even access to justice across the spectrum of American diversity. And the remedy to that, when you think about it,
actually tends to promote more, not less, use of the advocacy
process.
I do not want to be heard, either, as denigrating the role of the
peacemaker in the practice of law. I do not mean at all to be heard
as rebutting the notion that the lawyer has a genuine role as healer.
My point simply is this: those models do not exhaust the possibilities of the ways to be genuinely virtuous in the practice of the law,
where advocacy and the prophetic voice are in context more often
than suggested here, both required and righteous.
Rather I would propose some additional models that are very
simple. I want to leave you not with a critique, but a proposal. I
12. Walid Iqbal, Courts, Lawyering, and ADR: Glimpses into the Islamic Tradition,

28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1035 (2001).
13. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xx (1988) (commenting that the "standard conception" of the lawyer's role consists of "(1) a role
obligation ('the principle of partisanship') that identifies professionalism with extreme
partisan zeal on behalf of the client and (2) the 'principle of nonaccountability,' which
insists that the lawyer bears no moral responsibility for the client's goals of the means
used to attain them").
14. Comments of Professor Russell G. Pearce at the Dialogue on the Practice of
Law and Spiritual Values (Jan. 25, 2001) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL).
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believe we can think of lawyers, virtuous lawyers in all of the major
religious traditions, as occupying two paradigms that fit all of the
requirements that we have been talking about. One is a role as
leader and the second is a role as teacher. Many of the conundrums that have been presented to us-for example, "what would
you do when your senior partner says this to you"-invite a dialogue with that partner or between that partner and the client that
teaches him something and that uses the capacities of leadership to
try to draw someone to a more attractive solution. Not necessarily
successfully, but with the objective of advising wisely, of encouraging and of empowering, which is what I think we should be about.
And then, if we think about our roles in that way, we can start the
day with a prayer to which I am devoted, and I told you I would be
personal. It is a prayer essentially of thanksgiving and of dedication; it is the prayer from Isaiah-that "The Lord God has given
me a well trained tongue, that I might speak to the weary the word
'15
that will rouse them.

15. Isaiah 50:4.

THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND
SPIRITUAL VALUES
John W. Weiser*
Let me begin with a wonderful phrase, "It's simple, but it's not
easy." We usually know what we ought to do; doing it is another
thing.
There are two basic Commandments that, I believe, are at the
heart of the Abrahamic traditions represented on this panel: Love
God and love your neighbor.' Both of these Commandments
speak of a relationship with another. And I have long thought that
our over-riding objective is to work to strengthen and enrich the
relationships we have, make them more productive and more positive, and to resist actions that fray those relationships.
Not long ago, I read that recent work in quantum physics suggested that the most fundamental aspect of the universe is relationship.2 Particles do not exist in isolation; rather, they are in
relationship with another or others and that relationship itself affects their essence. That concept provides rich food for thought.
"Loving our neighbors," that is, recognizing their value and
treating them with the requisite respect seems simple, but it's not
easy. As Lou Craco, citing Ignatius, explained, we have to see the
world as it is; it is the context in which we operate.' Adam and
Eve, we read, were thrown out of the Garden of Eden; they came
into the world that we know as imperfect and complicated.
Today, several factors conspire to aggravate the imperfections.
We live in an age that puts great emphasis on the rights of the
individual. Many years ago, that emphasis was an important corrective to the power of a stifling state and state-like organizations.
But in our society, we may have gone too far in focusing on the
rights of the individual. We have become the "Me" Generation:
* John W. Weiser is the Chair of the Graduate Theological Union and a Director of XL Capital Ltd. and Freemont Group, Inc. From 1980 until 1996, he served as
Director, Senior Vice President, and General Counsel of Bechtel Group, Inc. Before
joining Bechtel, he was a Partner in the New York law firm of Sherman & Sterling.
1. E.g., Matthew 22:37-39.
2. MARGARET J. WHEATLEY, LEADERSHIP AND THE NEW SCIENCE: DISCOVERING ORDER IN A CHAOTIC WORLD 34-36 (2d ed. 1999).
3. Louis A. Craco, Faith and the Legal Profession: A Response, 28 FORDHAM
URB.

L.J. 1057 (2001).
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individuals concentrate on their own entitlements and consider less
the rights and needs of others or of the community.
Our society also puts a high value on competition. Competition
can be healthy and good, as when we push each other to be better
and respect each other for the effort. Unfortunately, too many people today believe that winning is the only thing and try to demonize
their opponents.
In our public life and in our media, we value the search for truth,
but that search seems to have no limits and has degenerated into a
politics of personal destruction.
So three valuable ideas-individualism, competition, and the
search for truth-have, through excess, become hurtful. Our society has a problem with limits. And limits, it seems to me, would
become more apparent and excesses correspondingly curbed, if we
spent more time considering the value and needs of others.
The legal system is part of our larger society and cannot help but
be affected by the excesses of that society. Clients who believe that
they have been wronged naturally focus first on their rights and
their position. That narrow view is exacerbated by society's mindset that suggests that each individual's rights are all that matter.
Our courts use the adversary system because we believe it is an
effective way to approach the truth in a case. Unfortunately, the
system is designed as a zero-sum game (though rarely is anyone
100% right) that emphasizes competition. When society teaches
that winning is the only thing and that the opponent is not worthy
of respect, abuse of the system is a likely consequence. Furthermore, a system that only allows for one winner will encourage
some to try to win at any cost. So costs escalate, leading to a vicious circle. I have had cases in which our costs were running at
one million dollars per month. That distorts reality.
Of course, we need a court system. It is the civilized alternative
to taking the law into your own hands, but beyond that simplistic
level, most of us understand that the threat of litigation is a powerful factor in working to settle a dispute. In most cases you work on
parallel tracks-keeping the threat of litigation alive as you try to
hammer out a mutually acceptable solution.
In light of the societal pressures on the judicial system, what are
we to do to live out our spiritual values? Perhaps because this Dialogue is under the auspices of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, we have focused on litigation and disputes. I will point out
later that the "Practice of Law," our subject, has much wider scope,
but let me stay with disputes for now. I am not a litigator, but as
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general counsel of a major company, I did have responsibility for
its legal disputes.
I begin again with our moral compass-"love your neighbor."
Treat the other the way you would want to be treated. "That which
you think harmful to yourself, do not do to others." Consider the
importance and value of the relationship.
It seems simple, but, of course, it's not easy.
When dealing with disputes, you have to work on two levelsfirst, on the individual case in front of you, and second, on the system as a whole. The individual situation, in my view, requires that
you be both buffer and educator. The client in front of you is angry. Professor Bush spoke of making room for the client.4 I take
that as meaning that you have to listen sympathetically to the client's story and allow him to express his very human emotions.
Then you have to move on to the educational effort. Rather
than reinforce the client's anger, the object is to help him to work
his way out of that. It is not going to happen at the first session; it
takes time. Professor Cobb spoke of making the story more complex.5 Working with the client, you elaborate the larger picture.
Together you try to understand how the other side perceives the
situation; the adversary begins to have a face, and you explore the
pragmatic implications of a fight.
In my practice, doing so was relatively straightforward. Most of
the disputes I encountered as general counsel were with customers,
suppliers, employees-all people with whom our relationships
were important. Of course, the executives dealing with specific situations might be mad, but anger and lashing out is rarely a
solution.
In that business context, one could recognize the wisdom of the
religious traditions that generally prefer settlement to a litigated
decision. The latter means that one party wins and the other loses
and the loser usually remains angry. Settlement is the preferable
way to preserve relationships.
Of course, there are people who know no reason and there are
people who are dangerous. If we discovered an employee or contractor who was violating the law, we treated it like cancer and
removed the problem quickly and completely. Similarly, if the
other side remains intransigent, a fight cannot be avoided. How4. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and ADR: Insights From the Jewish Tradition, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007 (2001).
5. Sara Cobb, CreatingSacred Space: Toward a Second-GenerationDispute Resolution Practice, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017 (2001).
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ever, my experience has been that situations that seem irretrievable at the outset almost always respond to respect and honest
efforts to explore commonalities.
As noted, you also have to work on the system as a whole. Here
I point with admiration to Jim Henry, who was the catalyst for this
Dialogue.6 Jim is a wonderful example of what can be done with
steady, focused, positive effort. Twenty years ago, many of us were
dismayed by dysfunctional aspects of the judicial system and were
searching for alternatives. Jim started us along a path to improvements with the simple alternative dispute resolution pledge: "If you
are a member of the club, I won't sue you without discussing alternatives with you first." 7 Though simple, it was a powerful first step.
And Jim has kept us moving along a progressive arc through arbitration, mediation, and interest-based negotiation to this Dialogue,
which explicitly deals with the practice of law and spiritual values.
One of our panelists, Lou Craco, also has been working for many
years at high levels to develop and implement rules for improved
professionalism of the bar.8
Professor Deming, one of the great gurus of modern business,
spoke of "constancy of purpose." 9 Progress is incremental; it takes
many small steps. You work around the really difficult people but
keep your eyes on the goal and keep working toward it.
As noted earlier, the panelists have focused on litigation. However, the topic is the "Practice of Law," and litigation, although
essential, is only a small part of the practice. If I were to compare
the law to medicine, I would say that litigation is like surgery. And
there is much more to medicine than surgery; many of us spend
busy, productive lives in less adversarial, more cooperative areas of
the practice.
I have spent almost all my career in the business world. That
work, happily for me, deals mostly with developing mutually beneficial commercial arrangements. I sometimes see myself as an architect of contractual structures, which, like physical structures,
have to be balanced and reinforcing to succeed. They must benefit
both sides. To design them you must ask yourself what the other
side needs and you have to put yourself, and your client, in the
6. James F. Henry, Introductory Remarks, 28

FORDHAM URB. L.J. 995 (2001).
7. See id.
8. Craco, supra note 3.
9. W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF CRISIS 23-24 (1986) (outlining fourteen
"Points of Management" through which American industry may transform itself for
the better).
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other guy's shoes. That sort of work seems to me to align readily
with the Commandment that you treat the other as you would be
treated. In the commercial world, I think it is true that "what goes
around, comes around." You will meet again.
Hence, I always have thought of the hard-ball, "take no prisoners" negotiators, intent on "winning" and "outwitting" the other
side as short-sighted. Of course, you have a duty to further your
client's interests, but in my experience, the client's interests, particularly in the business world, are rarely short-term. If you outwit
the other side, how long will it take them to discover the trick, and
what happens to the relationship then? This is a world where leaving an extra dollar on the table may be more an investment than a
loss.
At our graduation from law school, the dean told us that we are
now learned in "those wise constraints that make men free." What
a powerful paradox-that giving a bit, we get more in return; that
relationships can be better if we accept some limits on our demands. More powerful and relevant is the suggestion that at the
core of the law lies the wisdom that we all benefit as we accept
some limits and constraints. The vast majority of our fellow citizens instinctively understand that.
Progress is incremental. We can, if we choose, focus not just on
ourselves and our rights, but also on the others and their rightful
expectations and on the benefits of cooperation. If we keep constant to that purpose, we may in time achieve that happy, larger
world Professor Styers described-"a community where all can
flourish." 10
It's simple, but it's not easy.

10. Randall G. Styers, ProtestantPerspectives on Justice and Zealous Representation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1047 (2001).

KOK.
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SPIRITUALITY AND LAWYERING: A
PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
Stephen P. Younger*

I will start by disclosing my bias: I am a son, not of one, but of
two ministers. Growing up, I questioned every tenet of spirituality
before I grew to accept it. My first reaction when I was asked to
speak among these distinguished panelists was to question whether
religion has any legitimate relationship with the practice of law at
all. Under the critical analysis techniques I learned in law school, I
had to analyze such a subject to the nth degree. I envisioned myself
walking into a corporate client's office announcing my firm's new
practice area: "Jesus has taught me to turn the other cheek." I also
imagined the conversation that my client would have with my managing partner about taking their company's business elsewhere.
Naively perhaps, I said to myself, "I can separate my role as a
lawyer from my role as a religious person on weekends and about
an hour every night when I get home, before going to bed. I can
act as a lawyer during the day. I can do what is right when I teach
Sunday school or try to set an example for my children at home."
But reading the literature CPR assembled for this Dialogue led
to an epiphany.1 There is a role for a religious lawyer. There is
something religion can teach us about being a better lawyer.
Maybe that is what subconsciously drew me to alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR"), because it gives one much greater satisfaction
as a lawyer to problem solve and reach a mediated result than to
beat the pulp out of somebody through conventional litigation
tactics.
* Stephen P. Younger is a Partner in the firm of Patterson, Belknap, Webb &
Tyler. He has been active in various law-related organizations and has written extensively on alternative dispute resolution. He holds a B.A. degree from Harvard University and an L.L.B. degree from Albany Law School.
1. Joseph Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 (2001); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and ADR:
Insights From the Jewish Tradition, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007 (2001); Sara Cobb,
Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute Resolution Practice, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017 (2001); Walid Iqbal, Courts, Lawyering, and ADR:
Glimpses Into the Islamic Tradition, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1035 (2001); Randall G.
Styers, Protestant Perspectives on Justice and Zealous Representation, 28 FORDHAM
URB.

L.J. 1047 (2001).
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There are three main areas in which lawyers can draw on a
higher calling. But each of these raises many more dilemmas or
tensions than it does solutions.
The first area is exemplified by Joseph Allegretti's example of
Tolstoy's Ivan Ilyich.2 Ilyich had been a great lawyer and a great
judge, yet had never done anything for the world. But it was only
when he contracted his terminal illness that he paused to reflect on
his life and ask himself, "What have I done for the world?" We, as
lawyers, have a higher calling to do more than Ivan Ilyich did to
help others during his lifetime, and to reflect earlier than Ivan had
the opportunity to do. And we can do that in several ways.
One obvious opportunity to respond to this calling is through
pro bono work. We can help the less fortunate who need our services. But we also can help our private clients. We can help them
problem solve. We can form relationships with our clients. One of
the most rewarding possibilities we have in our practices as lawyers
is to be looked on as counselors, not just as hired guns. We can
also form relationships with our adversaries. My most efficient litigations have occurred when my relationship with an adversary allowed me to trust that person enough to pick up the phone and
reach a satisfactory result. It may not be a solution to the case. It
may just be an agreement about how many depositions we are going to take. But the most ineffective and the most unsatisfying results occur when lawyers have to go and see the magistrate every
time there is a document demand.
This higher calling can make us more satisfied professionals. Joseph Allegretti is absolutely right that the typical associates of major law firms are completely unsatisfied with their work. Pro bono
work is the one area from which they obtain true satisfaction. Nevertheless, lawyers can and should try to make their other work for
paying clients more satisfying.
My second point can be illustrated by the Thomas Moore example from Joseph Allegretti's book.4 Moore, as we all know, faced a
great dilemma when Henry VIII demanded that he do something
that Moore thought was not right. A modern day example of this
is the "Saturday Night Massacre" and how Attorney General Elliot
Richardson must have felt when he was forced to resign after refus2. JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTi, THE LAWYER'S CALLING 110-18 (1996) (citing Leo
Tolstoy, The Death of Ivan Ilyich, in THE COSSACKS/HAPPY EVER AFTER/THE
DEATH OF IVAN ILYICH

99 (Rosemary Edmonds trans., 1960)).

3. Allegretti, supra note 1.
4. ALLEGRETri, supra note 2, at 118-22.
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ing Richard Nixon's demand that he fire Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox.5
We all have boundaries as lawyers. We have an ethics code that
contains boundaries that are quite ephemeral and extremely hard
to interpret. When lawyers face moments which push us to the limits of these boundaries, we can look at what our faith teaches us,
look at what is moral and what is right. Unfortunately, in day-today life there are far more times when ethical practices do not
cross over the bounds of professional ethics yet raise our own
moral doubts about the cause of action. It is not uncommon that
we as lawyers are asked to do things that we do not believe in, but
that the client has a right to do.
That raises the third point that I draw out of this literature,
which is that we as lawyers can do more than just follow the instructions of our client. We can be problem solvers for our clients.
When we encounter a dispute, we should look for a solution. What
always troubled me about litigation was that for the first yeareven the second and third years-the business problems causing
the dispute were never discussed, except critically at a deposition.
Instead, what was discussed was how many depositions we were
going to take, how many document demands we were going to
serve, what kinds of legal causes of action we had or did not have,
and what kinds of defenses existed to those causes of actions. Nobody looked for the actual solution to the problem. As lawyers
who are active in the alternative dispute resolution world, we
should primarily be problem solvers and try to find solutions first.
But not every client wants that solution. Unfortunately, you
cannot use ADR as the only tool in your toolbox. If ADR is your
only tool, it is like saying, "Come, my client's wallet is open. Take
as much as you could possibly want." Thus, as a lawyer you also
must have adversarial tools. The real challenge is knowing when
and how often to influence your client to do something that they
initially feel they do not want to do. That influence must be employed sparingly in order to avoid the risk of alienating clients.
We can be better lawyers when we look to our spiritual values
for guidance. But it is very hard. There are many difficult situations we face in which there are no perfect solutions, regardless of
our religious values. But if we draw upon our intuition to help
solve these difficult problems, we can all become better as lawyers.
5. James M. Naughton, His Defense Is an Offense; Evidence Is Yet to Come, N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1973, § 4, at 1.
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AND NOW A WORD ABOUT SECULAR
HUMANISM, SPIRITUALITY, AND THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Carrie Menkel-Meadow*

The papers presented in this Dialogue raise very important and
moving questions about the relationship of spirituality, moral values, and religion to the practice of law generally, and the practice
of conflict resolution specifically. In this Commentary, I want to
focus on two related questions: First, where do our moral values,
spirituality, and sense of communion or connection come from?
And second, how do values derived from various sources of secular
humanism inform our practices? For some of us, organized religion is not the primary source of our commitment to the "moral"
values that inform our legal and conflict resolution practices, but
other values or values surprisingly similar to religious values do
inform our work. This Commentary addresses some of those alternative sources of "spiritual values," as used by the participants in
this Dialogue.
SOURCES OF VALUES

For many of us, spiritual values, morality, and religion are
"given," not chosen, in the sense that we accept what our forebears, our culture, our family, and our racial, ethnic, or religious
birthright, or "birth responsibility," gives us. For others of us, our
sense of spiritual place and values has been "chosen" by conversion, commitment, reattachment, or detachment from birthed endowments. For some of us, spiritual values and religion are
separate from our professional lives; for others of us, we have
sought to inform professional practice either with traditional reli-

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Visiting Professor of
Law, Harvard Law School, 2001; Chair, CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and
Standards in ADR. Thanks to Gary Menkel, Jack Himmelstein, and Howard Lesnick
for decades worth of spiritual discussions.
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gions'
or with modern and eclectic self-chosen notions of spirituality, 2 mindfulness, 3 or alternative sources of moral values.4
Where do our senses of moral commitments come from? Must
moral commitments be religious in nature? What does it mean to
speak of "spiritual" values in human action and in professional
practice? Can one be moral and spiritual, or have one's professional practice informed by spiritual and moral "values," without
being religious?
These are big questions and I will not do them justice here. But I
want to "intervene" this Commentary in the otherwise learned discussions in this Dialogue and raise another voice by asking some
more questions about what the values are that inform our practices, and suggesting some other sources for their origins and
development.
I begin with a brief biographical note since I will focus on "chosen," not given, aspects of spiritual values. I am the daughter of
Holocaust survivors, both German, one Jewish, one Catholic, who
arrived in the United States during the diaspora of the Second
World War. Both of my parents were comfortable in Germany
1. E.g.,

JOSEPH ALEGRE-TrI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING: CHRISTIAN

FAITH AND

(1996); Joseph Alegretti, Lawyers, Clients and Covenant: A Religious Perspective on Legal Practice and Ethics, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101 (1998);
LEGAL PRACTICE

HOWARD LESNICK,

(1998);

L.

LISTENING

FOR

GOD:

RELIGION AND MORAL DISCERNMENT

(1987); THOMAS L. SHAFA LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981); Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement. An Emerging Force in
Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998).
2. E.g., Zena D. Zumeta, Spirituality and Mediation, 11 MEDIATION Q. 25 (1993)
(defining spirituality as "an awareness of the connectedness of all things," and discussTHOMAS

SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS

FER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND

ing ways to bring it into mediation);

STEVEN KEEVA, TRANSFORMING

PRACTICES:

(1999) (describing the approaches and techniques of seven kinds of spiritually oriented law practices).
3. E.g., Len Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer: On the Possible Contributions of
Mindfulness Meditation to Law Students, Lawyers and Clients (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For an organization doing excellent work in, among other
things, organizing meditative retreats for law students, lawyers, and law professors in
collaboration with Yale University Law School, see Center for Contemplative Mind in
Society, Northampton, Massachusetts at http://www.contemplativemind.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2001).
4. For many years, for example, I was associated with a group of legal educators
who were using humanistic psychological principles to address "deeper" human values in the law. E.g., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY (Elizabeth Dvorkin et al. eds., 1981) (considering the impact that work in humanistic eduation can have on legal education);
Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514
(1978) (proposing the use of "humanistic educational methodologies" in law school
education as a way to enhance the profession).
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before their immigration and after some struggle and harrowing
experiences,5 became "comfortable" again. But in my family,
where the Holocaust was revisited constantly in conversation and
retelling of experiences,6 the conclusion was not to cling to our different religious traditions,7 but to see the harm that religious and
racial "belonging"8 causes when difference and discrimination turn
to hate and violence. For me, religious and racial divisions and differences meant horrific violence, and so my childhood was spent
thinking about ways to reduce such human suffering. My parents
strongly rejected their own traditional religious birthrights and I
was raised in the quasi-secular religious crucible of Ethical Culture
in the religious "revival" of the 1950s. 9
The religion of the Ethical Culture Society, founded by Felix Adler out of the social, political, and religious progressivism of late
nineteenth century American optimism, was, in the 1950s, a
strange mixture of quasi-religious tenets, such as "God is spelled
with two o's (Good)," and political commitments. 10 Most members
in New York also were active in SANE," the anti-nuclear movement, and the Civil Rights movement. Children attended the Encampment for Citizenship, a multi-racial summer camp, which
sought to teach children tolerance and appreciation for civil rights
and international human rights along with a 1950s-acceptable ver5. These included Kristallnacht,Nov. 9-10, 1938, a 1941 last-boat-out transatlantic
passage, much suffering in racial labeling, acts of discrimination, seizure of property
and self-respect, and, of course, the death of family members, friends, and lovers. My
parents were lucky-they survived and became comfortable again (in family and in
economics-the psychological harms are incalculable).
6. All of my grandparents survived to spend twenty years of Sundays at my childhood home telling stories in the German I learned to understand as a child deciphers
parental languages.
7. We celebrated the Christian ones-Christmas and Easter-in full pagan and
secular splendor, with both German and American traditions. I was born on Christmas Eve.
8. For an eloquent report on modern religious and ethnic wars, see MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF,

BLOOD AND

BELONGING:

JOURNEYS

INTO THE NEW

NATIONALISM

(1993).

9. ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE
AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); see also PETER BERGER, THE SACRED CANOPY: ELEMENTS OF A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF RELIGION (1967)
(describing the history and process of secularization).
10. E.g., FELIX ADLER, A NEW STATEMENT OF THE AIM
TURE SOCIETY
MODERN MAN

(1904);

OF THE ETHICAL CULALGERNON BLACK, ETHICAL CULTURE: A LIVING FAITH FOR

(1963).
11. SANE is the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. E.g.,
BAN THE BOMB: A HISTORY OF SANE: THE COMMITTEE FOR
POLICY 1957-1985 (1986).

MILTON S. KATZ,
A SANE NUCLEAR
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sion of basically socialistic principles, appropriately labeled an "experiment in democratic processes.' 1 2 My Sunday School classes
consisted of study of many of the world's religions, including Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism, Islam, Catholicism, Judaism,
Protestantism, Taoism, and Hinduism. We also read Margaret
Mead to learn about the human diversity in culture and living practices, and were introduced to sociology (in which I later majored in
college) and humanistic philosophy. The obvious "morality" of
this education was not biblical or talmudic doctrinal study and inculcation. Its purpose was to foster a sense of awe at human variation, and a curiosity and thirst for understanding others' lives,
practices, traditions, and cultures. Most importantly, it sought to
foster an internalization of something much greater than "tolerance "-"appreciation" for difference as well as disgust for ethnic
and religious imperialism, coercion, conversion, violence, and wars.
We all worked for peace and disarmament-very important and
difficult values to work for in the era of the Cold War-and for
civil rights (which is why peace, justice, and harmony always have
seemed fused for me in dispute resolution work, not separated or
antagonistic, as some have argued they are). 3
So religious birthrights can be replaced by formative experiences
(e.g., the Holocaust) that challenge, as well as reinforce, that into
which we are born. For many in my generation, religious sources
of values were trumped by political commitments. For those of us
who took part in the political movements of the 1960s, including
the Civil Rights, feminist, War on Poverty, anti-war, and, more recently, gay rights movements, various versions of "equality" and
"justice" were as important to us in any value structure as religious
fidelity, chastity, worship, fellowship, and devotion to any deity or
form of religious doctrine. As odd as it may seem today in 2001,
our "gods" or quasi-religious figures were Karl Marx, Che
Guevera, Martin Luther King, and, for me, Susan B. Anthony,
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Simone de Beauvoir, and Michael Harrington (author of The Other America). 4 Beginning with Karl
12.

ALGERNON BLACK, THE YOUNG CITIZENS: THE STORY OF THE ENCAMPMENT

(1962) (describing the principles, purposes, history, and ideals of the
Encampment movement).
13. E.g., Laura Nader, ControllingProcessesin the Practice of Law: Hierarchyand
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 1 (1993) (arguing that the dispute resolution movement is based on a "harmony ideology" that often has the coercive effect of pacifying participants).
14. MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA (1962). This book is credited
with suggesting to President Kennedy the basic blueprint for what became the War on
FOR CITIZENSHIP
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Marx, these "religious preachers" taught us to see that class injustice, whether organized by caste (race or gender) or by status
(slave, laborer, or wife) was systematic, oppressive, and immoral.
We saw that human beings could be the authors and agents of their
own lives, rather than passively accepting their lots (remember that
"religion is the opiate of the people").15 Thus, a belief in the centrality and importance of human, not divine, agency" was critical
to the "faith" of the 1960s. Our tenets of equality and fairness, as
well as equity and justice, were informed by a respect both for individualism and a communalism that sought to be far more inclusive
than traditional family, religious, or nation-state formations. As
political activists of the 1960s organized around labor, race, gender,
economic, anti-war, and life-style 17 issues, they formed alternative
institutions (communes, group homes, participatory networks, labor alliances, new relationships, and political organizations) 18 that
many believed would supplant traditional forms of family, religion,
and workplace. These commitments were (and still are, for some)
as strong as any of the more traditional pulls of religious or familyinspired morality. There was moral teaching in these movements:
people were to be treated as ends, not means; oppression of one
person or one class by another was wrong; individuals should be
free to self-define their destiny, and human resource allocation
should be just and fair.
Feminism taught another set of moral precepts. Some, such as a
belief in equal opportunity for individuals and disapproval of oppression and inequality, were consistent with other political movePoverty. It was one of the inspirational texts for me in my decision to be a Legal
Services lawyer for the poor. For a modern and equally moving account of how Legal
Services lawyers are committed to the amelioration of poverty and human and political suffering, see MELISSA FAY GREENE, PRAYING FOR SHEETROCK (1991).
15. KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (Verso
1998) (1848).
16. Recall that the Enlightenment's emphasis on human agency and "humanism"
was itself considered a counter-religion or counter-faith to the religious teachings it

was seen to supplant. "Humanism" was itself a religion for many in the eighteenth
century.
17. As a sociology student I wrote a paper in the 1970s suggesting that the social
revolution (divorce, changed sexual practices, racial and religious intermarriage, unmarried cohabitation, media access, etc.) likely would have longer lasting societal effects than the "political" revolutionary dreams and hopes of the 1960s. Was I right?
18. Consider the "flowering" of new political organizations like NOW (the National Organization of Women), SNCC (Student Non-violent Coordinating Commit-

tee), SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), and the Black Panthers. The political
spectrum of these groups ranged from organized legal activity such as that of the
NAACP (National Association of the Advancement of Colored People) LDF (Legal
Defense Fund), to more radical activity (e.g., the Weather Underground).
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ments. Feminism also challenged contemporary thinking,
eventually teaching (after some struggle within the movement itself) to valorize certain traditional "feminine" values. These included care for others, 19 mercy, 20 concerns for the "needs" as well
as instrumental "interests '21 of others, and belief in a necessity for
the larger society to play a role in sharing the care that any social
grouping requires. Women's consciousness raising groups, encouraging the "sharing" of experiences, the telling of narratives about
oppression and pain as well as the triumphant stories of freedom
gained, were, for many of us, substitutes for more traditional communal and religious gatherings. Women organized such ceremonies as feminist Passover Seders and "crowning" and "croning"
rituals to mark different passages in women's lives and to create
different kinds of sacred places and celebrations. For many, the
Woman's Movement was both political and spiritual-women who
were separated from each other by traditional family roles found
new kinship and loyalties. Explicitly, in both scholarship and practice, feminists sought to develop alternative value structures while
seeking transformed relationships at home and in the workplace.
Women reached out with their altered practical and spiritual connections in attempts to affect the larger society in which they were
embedded.22
After the political and cultural revolutions of the 1960s dissipated 23 and were replaced by the more materialistic and selfish
1980s and 1990s, a different form of spiritualism arose, one that
drew us inward. Many Americans, seeking spiritual enlightenment,
sought solace and different religious experiences in the religious
19. See generally ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1999).
20. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (discussing social
conditions of women lawyers and offering alternative values practiced by women lawyers); see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1 (depicting Portia, a noblewoman posing as a Doctor of Laws, telling Shylock, a usurer,
that mercy should temper justice).
21. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha!? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem
Solving and Teachable in Legal Education, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming
2001).
22. E.g., KNOWLEDGE, DIFFERENCE & POWER (Nancy Goldberger et al. eds.,
1996) (describing different and gendered "ways of knowing theory" and illustrating
alternative methods of perceiving and understanding gender and knowledge).
23. We are probably still too close to these movements to analyze them ourselves,
though that has not stopped many participant-historians from seeking to explain just
what happened to the mass commitments of this era. E.g., TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES:
YEARS OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE (1987); REASSESSING THE SIXTIES: DEBATING THE
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL LEGACY (Stephen Macedo ed., 1997).
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and meditative practices of the East, particularly various forms of
Zen Buddhism and a variety of "New Age" eclectic forms of mindfulness and reflective practice. If we could not be successful in
changing the conditions of the material world (or alternatively, if
we were too "successful" in the material world) we could turn to
inner reflection and enlightenment as a source of peace, tranquility, and harmony. We could contemplate and focus on the nonmaterial and spiritual world either as self-defined or as learned in
apprenticed years of contemplative practice and study.
So when I think of the places where our moral and spiritual values are learned, I find that more influences than only traditional
religious doctrines and practices inform how we think of our place
in the world as human beings, citizens, or moral people. The family, religious practice, and life experiences that form political and
secular, as well as religious alliances, all affect our consciousness
and moral "leaning." 24 Thus, I want to suggest that "secular humanism," as I have described at least one version of it (my own)
here, is itself a source of spiritual and moral values that informs
both the practice of law generally and the practice of conflict resolution particularly. Let me suggest briefly which values I believe
are informed by secular humanism and explain why secular humanism, in my view, should be credited, as much as traditional sources
of religious, moral, and spiritual learning, with providing informative and inspirational tenets for our practices.
THE VALUES THAT INFORM CONFLICT RESOLUTION PRACTICE

Whatever the discipline from which we choose to recognize our
values, I think that all of us at this conference, or readers of this
Dialogue, share a sense that our professional practice should be
informed with human significance, meaning, and "good" values.
"Good" values enhance human flourishing, promote respect for
others, allow us to recognize our human commonalities and connections as well as our individual differences, and enable us,
through our own actions, to make the world a better place than we
found it. In this, lawyers (conceived as human and social problemsolvers) and mediators or conflict resolvers (as peacemakers and
24. Note that I have not discussed secular professional moral norms and rules here
which is a bit odd for a legal and dispute resolution ethicist, but in fact, I think such
rules and regulations do not form our "moral consciousness." We consult such rules
and regulations for guidance or for post hoc rationalization of actions and moral

stances that I believe are actually framed, at least initially, outside of these official and
regulatory boxes.
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healers) can find some common purposes. But it is also important,
I think, to trace and consider our differences. Just as there are
"false cognates" in languages there are also "false cognates" when
we assume that words have the same meaning in different contexts.
Litigative lawyering is not the same as mediational lawyering, just
as not all religious and spiritual traditions mean the same thing
when they speak of "holiness" or "salvation." So, focusing on my
starting place of a more secular experience of humanism and spirituality-expressed as care for the other, as well as the self-and
with a heavy dose of political "justice," I will outline briefly the
values that I think are crucial to our practice as dispute or conflict
resolvers.25
Conflict resolvers begin with different perspectives on conflict.
There is a great deal of talk in our field today about "managing" or
"resolving" conflict, and many are drawn to the work of conflict
resolution in order to make peace or deal with unproductive conflict. But others, especially those of us from the secular humanist
group I have outlined above, were reared in conflict-familial generation gaps, struggles with authority for self-determination and redefinition of the person, fights and arguments with lovers, bosses,
and friends over racial and gender equality. The Civil Rights
movement included both Mahatma Ghandi's and Martin Luther
King's "passive resistance" and "non-violent civil disobedience, 26
but it also included a great deal of conflict, some unfortunately
physical, and much of it hostile and verbal. Conflict in the contexts
of some of those political struggles allowed spiritual realignments
as whites joined blacks and some men joined women in these efforts. "We Shall Overcome," the anthem of the Civil Rights movement, is both a "spiritual" song and a call to action. Thus, some of
us see growth and movement, transformation, realignments, social
change, and justice emerging from conflict, so that not all conflict is
25. Within our field, "dispute" is usually intended to connote the concrete argument, dispute, or rupture that causes a problem, disagreement, or lawsuit. "Conflict"
is the larger relationship or set of issues in which the concrete dispute may be located.
Lawyers, mediators, arbitrators, consensus builders, and other dispute professionals
work at both levels. Within our own discipline there is healthy disagreement about
whether disputes are simply "settled" or whether conflicts or people can be "transformed" through our practice. E.g. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER,
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994); cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of
Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Practicesand Paradigms,11
NEG.

J. 217 (1995).

26.

PETER ACKERMAN & JACK DUVALL, A FORCE MORE POWERFUL: A CENTURY OF NON-VIOLENT CONFLICT (2000) (describing the significant non-violent con-

flict political movements of the twentieth century).
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bad and not all conflict must be "managed" or "resolved." I prefer
to speak of conflict "handled" or "channeled" (productively).
Struggle for liberation is part of The Bible and also part of a political story. The search for liberation and autonomy is one of those
human universals. So is the search for connection. What is not so
universal is how much violence or physical harm we must endure
or how much may be justified to right some of the human wrongs
we seem to inflict on each other. (What is self-defense and what is
aggression at the inter-personal, as well as international, level?)
Thus, what we think about the relationship of peace and harmony
to justice may inform how we exercise our practice. Sara Cobb's
essay in this Dialogue 27 suggests an active, dare I say "ministerial"
or "pastoral," role for the mediator. In this role, the mediator actively engages parties in creating a narrative that brings conflict to
the fore so it can be examined, "moralized," and reconstructed in
proposed future actions to alter the relationship of the parties.
Conflict is framed and scrutinized in order to examine identity,
meaning, roles, and morality and to create change and a more
"moral" relationship. The mediator is active, rather than passive,
in the creation, description, and use of conflict, all presumably to
achieve a higher purpose and a better relationship for the parties
(and the larger workplace in which they are embedded).
Even with a great deal of conflict expressed in a mediation or
other dispute resolution setting, including litigation, we know we
serve a higher purpose in the not-so-linear development of the
human species. Mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and yes, even
litigation, are substitutes for armed physical violence. We have
moved from "trial by combat" to "trial by words." We hope, if we
can deal with the "disputes" among us (both individuals and
groups) then maybe we can prevent or discharge some of those
disputes that would ripen into the larger "conflicts" that cause war
and killing. So we seek peace, if not total harmony, even when we
are at our worst in verbal combat.
At our best, conflict resolution professionals seek to express values other than simple "peace," dispute settlement, or cessation of
28
violence. Many of us prefer the instrumental, Pareto-optimizing
sense of solving problems in a participatory, open, and party-di27. Sara Cobb, CreatingSacred Space: Toward a Second GenerationDispute Resolution Practice,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017 (2001).
28. Pareto-optimizing means that each party has maximized its own gain without
further harm to the other party. It represents the most "efficient" outcome. HOWARD
RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION

139 (1982).
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rected setting to the binary, third-party neutral structure of litigation or arbitration 29 that has routinized or regularized outcomes
imposed from on
high or from without. For others of us, it is the
"reconciliation ' 30 of human beings or transformation of relationships, which Albie Davis called the "magic" of mediation, 31 and
Sara Cobb calls the "sacred ' 32 moment of understanding and reorientation to another human being, as well as the self. For those
of us who have experienced these moments, they are about
changes in individuals and relationships as well as social and political change. They can be about justice as parties reorient themselves in ways that seem more fair and honest and in which they
make new promises to each other (the ceremony or ritual of mediation, captured here by Sara Cobb).33 They may enable people to
be further connected to a larger community, not just of two, but of
others with whom they are associated-the family, the workplace,
or some other community.34
But the secular humanist teachings to which I refer above also
lead us to other values. Feminism has asked us to take caring for
others seriously, as we recognize that we are not all always equal.
As the disability community suggests, we are all "temporarily
abled," most of us requiring care at early and late stages of the life
cycle and some of us requiring care for longer periods than that.
From our illnesses and differentially abled places, we should acknowledge the interdependence of human beings in all places, including in the family, the workplace, the place of worship, the daily
commute, or the gym. We need and depend on each other, and
fundamental human "needs" as well as instrumental "interests"
need to be recognized and reconciled. We must learn to trust each
other while giving and receiving care. Although some rail against
the power inequalities in mediation or other forms of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR"), I suggest that mediation and some
29.

MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS:

A

COMPARATIVE AND

POLITICAL ANALYSIS

(1981) (describing the elements of the classical adjudicatory and dispute resolution
triad).
30. Andrew McThenia & Thomas Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94

YALE

L.J. 1660

(1985).
31. Albie Davis, The Logic Behind the Magic of Mediation, 5 NEC. J. 17 (1989).
32. Cobb, supra note 27.
33. Id.
34. E.g., Clark Freshman, Privatizing Same-Sex "Marriage" Through Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Community-Enhancing Versus Community Enabling Mediation,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1687 (1.997) (arguing that "community-enabling mediation" is an
effective way for same sex couples to create a marriage-like union and connect to the
larger communities, both gay and straight, in which such couples live).
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forms of ADR are most appropriate for honestly addressing inequalities and meeting the needs of unequal parties. In mediation,
people can recognize and face up to their human responsibilities,
not because someone has ordered them to, but because they have
come fully to understand and comprehend someone else's reality
and limitations.
ADR or conflict resolution practices acknowledge a greater
human variability of action than do the ritualized or overly stylized
forms of litigation practice. This allows values other than being
"right" to be imagined and enacted. Portia's plea for mercy35 or
forgiveness, the granting of an apology36 and human acknowledgment of wrongfulness, if not legal fault or blame, all allow the fuller
expression of a richer gamut of human actions, emotions, and feelings and we hope, a more humane set of responses.
At the same time, secular humanist movements that see "justice"
as equally important a value as forgiveness and reconciliation, remind us that conflict resolution practices must serve many masters.
It is not enough to provide a location for a sacred ceremony or a
ritual of understanding and reconciliation if injustices remain.
Thus, conflict resolution professionals have learned to create their
own doctrines that recognize substantive values (equality, liberty,
self-determination, equity, and fairness 37) as well as process or
"ceremonial" values (participation, "voice," and groundrules).
And related to this, for me, is the misconception held by many that
mediation cannot promise justice because it offers up too much
compromise. In this Dialogue, Professor Bush traces the recognition of compromise in the Talmud, as a "preference for ADR" over
rabbinical judgment. 38 The motivation is one I heartily agree
with-that the parties are better off coming to their own terms
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 20.
36. E.g. Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 So. CAL. L. REV.
1009 (1999) (discussing the beneficial role of apologies in dispute resolution); Arthur
Rosett & Hiroshi Wagatsuma, The Implications of Apology: Law and Culture in Japan
and the United States, 20 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 461 (1986) (discussing the different roles
that an apology plays in American and Japanese dispute resolution).
37. For what remains, for me, the most eloquent statement of how mediators have
values, that include presiding over "fairness" and not genuflecting unnecessarily to
"neutrality," see Lawrence Susskind, EnvironmentalMediation and the Accountability
Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1 (1981); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Ethics in Environmental ADR: An Overview of Issues and Some Overarching Questions, 34 VAL. L.
REV. 403 (2000) (considering the ethics of mediator activism in environmental ADR
cases and discussing whether or not attorneys have an ethical obligation in such cases
to ensure that the interests of outsiders are somehow accounted for and expressed).
38. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and ADR: Insights From the Jewish Tradition, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007 (2001).

35. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 20;
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(those they have a hand in making) rather than having to accept a
verdict imposed from outside, even if from a wise elder. Compromise, it is said, provides for peace. Adjudication produces winners
and losers who will continue to seek rectification (appeal) or wreak
vengeance or revenge on each other and so litigation continues the
fighting and battles. But I would suggest that our secular humanism has made progress beyond the Talmud. Compromise may produce the same sense of arbitrary peace and injustice, if, for
example, we simply "split the difference" to achieve peace and closure. Instead, as I have argued in many articles, 39 rather than compromise, where each party is likely to feel as if they have still
"given up something," we should seek to meet each other's needs
and interests and not cut the orange 40 or chocolate cake 41 in half.
Professor Bush would suggest that compromise includes the deeper
religious value of "charity"-that we learn to give up more than we
have to when we compromise and learn to "lose our self" in recognition of the other.42 I agree that generosity is a value we seek to
foster in ADR, but I wonder whether "giving up" to the other side
may encourage feelings of patronization, resentment, and "unjust
enrichment." Achieving a "fair" result, rather than a compromise,
appeals to me as a more appropriate expression of the values that
inform good mediation (or negotiation). This is what I believe
Rabbi Hillel meant when he said, "If I am not for myself, who will
be for me?" and "If I am only for myself, what am I? '' 43 We can

seek ways for righteousness, justice and recognition of both (or
all) 44

parties to a mediation. 45 Compromise need not mean "meet-

39. E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984).
40. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETrING TO YES 73 (2d ed. 1991).

41. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 39, at 781.
42. Bush, supra note 38.

43.

PIRKE ABOTH: SAYINGS OF THE FATHERS

1:14 (Isaac Unterman, ed. & trans.,

1964).
44. It is important to recognize that many legal and other problems that are
brought to ADR are no longer about two parties only. Many modern legal problems
involve multiple parties and multiple stakeholders. E.g., LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL.,
THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK (1999) (describing and illustrating the multiparty, multi-issue social and legal disputes common in our culture today, including
environmental, municipal finance, health care, abortion, and resource allocation
problems); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996) (discussing the

weaknesses of the modern binary adversarial system and possible approaches to address its deficiencies).
45. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 25, for my argument that transformation, empowerment, and recognition, the "spiritual" values of ADR, are not inconsistent with
each other and most often are paired with the instrumental "problem-solving" aspects

2001]

A HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON ADR

1085

ing halfway" or "giving something up." Solutions can be reached
in which parties seek to meet each other's complementary needs
without "giving in."46
To the extent that mediation ideology contains within it the
value of respect for the other, or reciprocity, then one should consider the Golden Rule as a useful and, perhaps, almost universal,
expression of how parties (and their lawyers)47 might deal with
each other in dispute resolution settings. Treating others as one
would want to be treated suggests both substantive and process
values informed by both "spiritual respect" and "secular justice"
concerns. When reciprocity works most effectively, it encourages a
stance of mutual respect and real, as well as "active, listening" to
the other. It also facilitates the kind of re-ordered private norm
creation that caused one "god" of mediation (Lon Fuller) to suggest that mediation's basic purpose is its ability to "reorient the
parties to each other."48
Thus, to conclude, mediation and various other forms of ADR
practices are informed by some basic core values, accepted almost
universally by different religious and spiritual disciplines. As a
form of peacemaking, mediation with its emphasis on healing,
human understanding, apology and acknowledgment of wrong, and
anticipation of improved future relationships expresses human possibilities for transcendence in conflict resolution. Mediation also,
however, as I have argued here, serves important secular humanist
values and we should not forget these. If we are to empower, recof ADR. One is unlikely truly to solve a problem without some recognition and
shared worldview (at least for purposes of making an agreement), and empowerment
and recognition cannot really occur if some outcome is not achieved that makes the
parties feel whole, as well as holy.
46. The moral conception of compromise is actually quite complex, connoting
sometimes weakness and arbitrariness in "giving up," but also sometimes facilitating
continued relations. Our concerns are when "compromise" seems to connote giving
up a moral principle, unless the larger moral principle is preserving the greater union
or relationship. For a longer discussion of compromise, see generally COMPROMISE IN
ETHICS, LAW AND POLITICS

(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1979) and

Mary Parker Follett, Constructive Conflict, in MARY

A

PARKER FOLLET-r: PROPHET OF

1920's 67 (Pauline Graham
ed., 1996). For the role of compromise in political constitution making see, for example, JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING
OF THE CONSTITUTION 57 (1996).
47. For my argument that lawyers ought to apply the Golden Rule when dealing
with their own clients, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Lying to Clients for Economic
Gain or PaternalisticJudgment. A Proposalfor a Golden Rule of Candor, 138 U. PA.
L. REV. 761 (1990).
48. Lon Fuller, Mediation: Its Form and Its Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 305,
308 (1971).
MANAGEMENT:

CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE
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ognize, and conciliate with others, we also must have justice, good
faith, honesty, and some transparency about our processes and the
outcomes they create. Although there are many aspects of mediational values that lend themselves to the "do be" list (positive
things), we also must take account of the "don't be's" (remember
the Ten Commandments are mostly exhortations of what not to
do-"thou shalt nots"). ADR or mediation should not be used to
pacify legitimate grievances or conflicts that need to be expressed.
ADR should not produce "unjust" outcomes (whatever those
might be, both for the parties affected by a particular dispute, as
well as those inside of it).4 9 As we seek to focus on the future, we
cannot forget the past. °
If mediation is to express fully the values we hope for it, we face
some interesting, if daunting, tasks ahead. First, given the diversity
of "sources" of values for religious, spiritual and secular humanist
inspirations for ADR practices, should we simply acknowledge a
multiplicity of sources and "let a thousand flowers bloom?" What
if one person's sacred recognition is another's feeling of patronization? What ought the role of the mediator to be? Facilitator of
compromises? Active participant in morally constructed narratives? Peaceseeker? Ceremonial healer? Should we eliminate
mechanistic groundrules (e.g., turntaking, or no interruptions) to
allow greater spiritual and more spontaneous feelings to be expressed? Discussion about values informing professional practices
often devolve into discussions about prudence and judgment versus
rules. I have spent the last five years drafting ethical standards and
principles for the practice of ADR in both individual and provider
group settings 51 and I remain agnostic on the question of whether
49. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2696 (1995).
50. For me, Trina Grillo eloquently expressed the concern that peace and future
orientedness in mediation was disregarding the past in an unjust way. Trina Grillo,
The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991);
see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught Me: Reflections on Mediation,
Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1413 (1997) (reminding mediators to
focus on the past, as well as the future, when reconciling parties to each other). Many
others, like Sara Cobb, are now exploring the importance of fully elaborated narratives, including the reporting of past harms and pains, as necessary to a truly healing
practice of mediation and reconciliation. For an interesting work exploring the benefits and drawbacks of various forms of compensatory and non-compensatory measures to redress the suffering of victims of mass atrocities, see MARTHA MINOW,
BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND
MASS VIOLENCE (1998).

51. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The Many "Cs" of ProfessionalResponsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 979 (2001).
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good values, good people, market forces, or elaborate ethical rule
systems ultimately will control our practice.
Second, it is one thing for us to focus on the "good values" that
inform the best of conflict resolution or mediation practice. But as
long as the practice of law continues to reward "hired guns," bottom-lines, or simply people who prefer a good fight or a good argument,52 the healing values of lawyering must be transmitted not
only to the mediators, but to the lawyers who appear in mediation
and their clients. This is one place that legal work and education is
heading, but instead of our lawschools teaching the "healing arts,"
or problem solving, I see courses on "mediation advocacy," an oxymoron that promises to continue traditional adversarial combat
values and import them into newer forms of conflict resolution.
CONCLUSION

It seems important to me that the sacred, religious, and spiritual
values that inform most of what is good about conflict resolution
should not be cabined to the church, synagogue, mosque, or zendo.
To achieve peace, justice, reconciliation, intersubjective understanding, solutions of good quality to conflicts, as well as productive uses of conflict, we must consider the secular humanist values
of self-determination and autonomy, as well as interdependence
and mutual caring, both when they coincide with religious values,
and also when they differ. As a member of the Ethical Culture
Society, and as a member of the human race, I still believe that
"god" is spelled with two "o's." What that means in lawyering and
conflict resolution practice remains to be elaborated. The challenge will be to see whether we can join pursuit of connection,
communion, and collective meaning with autonomy, self-determination, and justice. Good conflict resolution practice recognizes
that when ADR works, our knowledge and understanding transcend different conceptions of facts, interpretations, and meaningmaking systems. We find value in the valuing of our fellow human
beings.
52. Despite all the claims that lawyers are dissatisfied with their work, see Joseph
Allegretti, A Christian Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 997 (2001), many lawyers I know still claim to love their work because they
"love to win," "love to make a good argument," "love to cut a good deal," "fight for

justice," etc. Perhaps someone ought to explore the secular, not-so-humanist, values
that still motivate many conventional lawyers. And this, of course, does not include
the younger generation, many members of which do not even want to practice law if
there are other ways of making a more comfortable and bigger living.
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